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CEO Side Payments in Mergers and Acquisitions 
Brian Broughman∗ 
In addition to golden parachutes, CEOs often negotiate for personal 
side payments in connection with the sale of their firms. Side payments 
differ from golden parachutes in that they are negotiated ex post in 
connection with a specific acquisition proposal, whereas golden 
parachutes are part of the executive’s employment agreement negotiated 
when she is hired. While side payments may benefit shareholders by 
countering managerial resistance to an efficient sale, they can also be 
used to redistribute merger proceeds to management. This Article 
highlights an overlooked distinction between pre-merger golden 
parachutes and merger side payments. Similar to a legislative rider 
attached to a popular bill, management can bundle a side payment with 
an acquisition that is desired by target shareholders. Thus, even if 
shareholders would not have approved the side payment for purposes of ex 
ante incentives, they may support the payment as part of a take-it-or-
leave-it merger vote. Because side payments are bundled into merger 
transactions, voting rights cannot adequately protect shareholders 
against rent extraction. My analysis helps explain empirical results, 
which show that target CEOs sometimes bargain away shareholder 
returns in exchange for personal side payments. I conclude with legal 
reforms to help unbundle side payments from the broader merger vote. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In connection with its 2005 acquisition of The Gillette Company, 
Procter & Gamble offered temporary employment plus a side payment 
worth approximately $23 million to Gillette’s then-CEO, James M. 
Kilts.1 The side payment was structured as a non-compete agreement, 
and it was in addition to the change of control payouts (“golden 
parachutes”) included in Mr. Kilts’s pre-merger employment 
contract.2 Mr. Kilts was the primary individual negotiating on behalf 
of Gillette.3 The merger proposal, which included an 18% premium 
for target shareholders,4 was ultimately endorsed by Mr. Kilts, 
unanimously supported by Gillette’s board of directors,5 and approved 
by 96% of the firm’s voting shareholders.6 
Though the magnitude of benefits received by Mr. Kilts is 
unusual,7 the basic use of side payments is not. In acquisitions of both 
privately- and publicly-held firms, it is common for acquirers to offer 
the CEO (and sometimes other top executives) of the target firm 
either post-merger employment or some form of side payment.8 Side 
payments are structured in a variety of different ways, including (i) 
merger bonuses (often structured as non-compete agreements); (ii) 
augmented parachute entitlements; (iii) employment or post-merger 
consulting contracts; (iv) ‘unscheduled’ stock options during merger 
 
 1. Gillette Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) I-67 (May 25, 2005). 
 2. Id. at I-66 to I-67. 
 3. See id. at I-22 to I-25. 
 4. Lloyd Vries, Procter & Gamble Acquires Gillette, CBS MONEYWATCH (Jan. 28, 2005), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/procter-gamble-acquires-gillette/. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Procter and Gillette Shareholders Approve $57 Billion Merger, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/13/business/procter-and-gillette-shareholders-
approve-57-billion-merger.html. 
 7. See Charles Forelle & Mark Maremont, Gillette CEO Payday May Be Richer, WALL 
ST. J. (Feb. 3, 2005), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB110738943232044343 (summarizing 
the benefits awarded to Kilts). 
 8. See infra notes 30–37 and accompanying text. Side payments are not limited to the 
target CEO. Other members of the target firm’s senior management team sometimes receive 
side payments as well; however, to facilitate meaningful comparisons empirical studies typically 
focus on the CEO. See id. To the extent that other members of senior management are involved 
in merger negotiations the analysis in this Article applies to such individuals as well as to the 
CEO. For ease of terminology and to track existing data, however, I will typically refer to the 
target CEO rather than to the loose collection of target managers involved in merger 
negotiations who happen to receive side payments. 
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negotiations; or (v) a board seat with the acquiring firm.9 The dollar 
amounts paid out in such side deals are substantial. CEOs of publicly-
held target firms typically receive a larger aggregate payout from 
merger side deals ($2 million)10 than from pre-merger golden 
parachute arrangements ($1.5 million).11 
On the one hand, side payments may benefit shareholders by 
countering managerial resistance to an efficient sale. Because an 
acquisition is likely to cause the target CEO to lose her job, future 
income, and various private benefits, she may credibly threaten to 
block the sale unless she is offered post-merger employment with the 
acquiring firm or a lucrative side payment to compensate for her loss. 
To be sure, support of management is not technically required to sell 
a firm. But as a practical matter, it is difficult to sell over the objections 
of the CEO and senior management. The CEO is typically the primary 
party negotiating the deal on behalf of the target, and even when this 
is not the case, an uncooperative management team may destroy 
considerable value that the acquirer hopes to gain from the deal, 
suggesting that all parties can benefit from a well-structured side 
payment. Viewed in this light, merger side payments can help 
counteract managerial entrenchment and align the interests of the 
CEO with shareholders (“Incentive Alignment”).12 
Alternatively, there is a risk that side payments may be used to 
enrich the CEO at shareholders’ expense (“Rent Extraction”).13 The 
target CEO—acting as bargaining agent for the corporation—may 
accept a lower merger premium in exchange for personal gain through 
a side payment that does not benefit shareholders as a class. Empirical 
studies have found lower acquisition premiums associated with 
mergers in which the target CEO receives a side payment.14 
Furthermore, some forms of side payments are associated with 
 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. See infra notes 37–45 and accompanying text. This may understate the benefits that 
CEOs receive from merger side payments, as it does not include the value of post-merger 
employment with the acquiring firm. Including an estimated value for post-merger employment 
suggests that target CEOs receive an average benefit of approximately $4.3 million from merger 
side deals.  Id. 
 11. See infra Table 1. 
 12. See infra Section III.A. 
 13. See infra Section III.B. 
 14. See infra Section III.B. 
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abnormal positive returns for the acquiring firm, suggesting collusion 
between the target CEO and acquirer in pricing deals.15 
Despite this evidence, legal scholars have given little attention to 
problems associated with merger side payments. Presumably one 
reason for this omission is that the law already requires that any extra 
benefits—including side payments—received by senior management 
in an acquisition be disclosed to shareholders and that the entire 
transaction be subject to both board and shareholder approval.16 
Informed shareholder approval generally mitigates concern related to 
conflicts of interest.17 Given these procedural safeguards, why do 
empirical studies nonetheless find evidence of rent extraction? Put 
another way, why would a target’s shareholders and board of directors 
vote to approve a merger that gives money away to the CEO? The 
existing literature in both law and finance does not have a good answer 
to this question. 
Addressing this gap, I propose a new theory for merger side 
payments that explains why rent extraction persists despite existing 
legal protections for shareholders. While a typical agency conflict is 
driven by shareholders’ inability to observe bad behavior and lack of 
incentive to monitor management, merger side payments present a 
different problem. Similar to a legislative rider attached to a popular 
bill, management can use its agenda-setting power to bundle a side 
payment with a sale of the firm that is desired by target shareholders. 
Shareholders cannot oppose the side payment unless they are willing 
to block the entire deal and give up the acquisition premium 
associated with the sale.18 Disclosure and voting rights do not help. 
Indeed, even if shareholders would not have approved the side 
payment for purposes of ex ante incentives, the payment may rationally 
receive ex post shareholder support as part of a take-it-or-leave-it 
merger vote. 
 
 15. See infra Section III.B. 
 16. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 50 (3d ed. 2012). 
 17. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(2) (2016). In fact, shareholder approval is 
one reason that merger side payments are often entitled to protection under the business 
judgment rule. See id.; see also infra Section III.C. 
 18. Acquisitions typically occur at a significant premium above the pre-deal share price. 
See, e.g., Gregor Andrade, Mark Mitchell & Erik Stafford, New Evidence and Perspectives on 
Mergers, 15 J. ECON. PERSPECT. 103, 106 (2001) (showing an average median premium 
between 34% and 47%). 
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My analysis highlights an important but overlooked distinction 
between golden parachutes and merger side payments. Golden 
parachutes are part of an executive’s employment agreement 
negotiated at the time she was hired; they are not linked to a specific 
acquisition. While a parachute may change the threshold level at which 
a CEO is willing to support a sale of her firm, it does not create a 
conflict with respect to the CEO’s negotiation of merger premium.19 
The CEO still has every incentive to bargain for a high shareholder 
premium. By contrast, side payments create an incentive for the CEO 
to trade away shareholder premium in exchange for a larger side 
payment. Consistent with this distinction, empirical studies find more 
evidence of rent extraction associated with side payments than with 
golden parachutes.20 
Legal and extra-legal constraints limit, but do not remove, rent 
extraction.21 For example, an auction may force an acquirer to devote 
its funds to shareholder premium and the threat of tax penalty may 
limit side payments over a threshold level.22 Nonetheless, these 
constraints are incomplete and unable to eliminate the risk of rent 
extraction. Indeed, as long as side payments are disclosed to 
shareholders, corporate law largely shields them from judicial review, 
giving shareholders little ability to counteract the CEO’s agenda-
setting power.23 
I conclude by proposing a small reform to corporate law to help 
unbundle side payments from the broader merger vote. In particular, 
firms should be permitted to opt into a heightened fiduciary standard 
by placing language in the firm’s charter requiring that any side benefit 
received by the CEO and possibly other members of senior 
management, must be approved by a separate vote, upon which the 
broader acquisition cannot be contingent. To avoid the possibility that 
shareholders may decline to approve an ex post side payment, firms 
selecting this option would be encouraged to address the problem ex 
ante by adopting golden parachutes and related agreements. I explain 
 
 19. See infra note 112. 
 20. See infra notes 111–114, 118–121 and accompanying text. 
 21. The prospect of a second bidder may limit excessive side payments because such 
payments would divert funds away from the purchase price and thereby place the original bidder 
at a competitive disadvantage in any resulting auction for the target. This constraint, however, is 
only binding to the extent that there are multiple parties who might bid for the target firm. See 
infra Section V.A. 
 22. See infra Section V.B. 
 23. See infra Section V.D. 
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how this proposal could reduce the CEO’s agenda-setting power with 
respect to side payments, while still giving firms flexibility to 
compensate CEOs for negotiating a sale of the business. 
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part II 
describes empirical studies of merger side payments in connection with 
the sale of publicly- and privately-held firms. Part III considers two 
explanations for the use of side payments: incentive alignment and rent 
extraction. Part IV develops a new theory for rent extraction through 
bundled side payments. Specifically, it demonstrates that target CEOs 
can use control over the corporate agenda to bundle an opportunistic 
side payment into a desired merger transaction, thereby making it 
impossible for target shareholders to oppose the side payment without 
also voting against the merger. Part V considers legal and extra-legal 
constraints that may limit merger side payments. Part VI proposes a 
small change to corporate law to help unbundle side payments from 
the broader acquisition. Part VII concludes. 
II. EVIDENCE OF MERGER SIDE PAYMENTS 
While an acquisition may cause the target CEO to lose her job and 
reduce her future income, it can also provide her with a variety of 
financial benefits. The first comprehensive study of the various 
benefits—including side payments—that CEOs of publicly-held 
targets receive in connection with the sale of their firms was conducted 
by Jay Hartzell, Eli Ofek, and David Yermack; their study is based on 
data from the sale of 311 publicly traded targets in the late 1990s.24 
For privately-held targets, the only empirical work documenting side 
payments is my own research with Jesse Fried,25 which is based on the 
sale of 50 startups in the early 2000s. 
Side payments are not the only type of benefit that target CEOs 
receive when their firms are sold. Executives, like other shareholders, 
also receive any premium applied to their equity in the target firm. For 
example, an acquirer may be willing to pay $40 per share for a target 
firm that had been trading for $30 per share prior to the acquisition, 
 
 24. Jay C. Hartzell, Eli Ofek & David Yermack, What’s in It for Me? CEOs Whose Firms 
Are Acquired, 17 REV. FIN. STUD., Jan. 2004, at 37, 41 [hereinafter Hartzell]. 
 25. See generally Brian Broughman & Jesse M. Fried, Carrots and Sticks: How VCs Induce 
Entrepreneurial Teams to Sell Startups, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1319 (2013) [hereinafter 
Broughman & Fried, Carrots and Sticks]; Brian Broughman & Jesse M. Fried, Renegotiation of 
Cash-Flow Rights in the Sale of VC-Backed Firms, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 384 (2010). 
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a 33% premium over the pre-existing share price. Combining stock 
and option gains, the average target CEO receives equity appreciation 
of just under $5 million when her firm is sold.26 This amount does not 
include the base value of the CEO’s equity holdings prior to the 
announcement of the acquisition. It only measures the premium 
applied to the CEO’s equity. Most CEOs also receive a substantial 
change of control payout, or “golden parachute” (averaging $1.5 
million),27 based on their pre-merger employment contracts. 
Side payments are, however, a substantial component of the 
merger benefits that a target CEO typically receives. Merger side 
payments are extra amounts given to the target CEO that are 
negotiated in connection with a specific merger transaction. These 
benefits did not exist, even as contractual entitlements, prior to the 
negotiation of the merger. Other members of the target’s senior 
management team may also receive side payments;28 however, to 
facilitate comparison, empirical studies typically focus on the CEO.29  
 Existing studies document four general categories of merger side 
payments. First, parachute payments are sometimes “augmented by 
the target’s board of directors at the time that it approves the merger.”30 
Though technically structured as a golden parachute, this benefit 
functions as a merger side payment since it was negotiated in 
connection with a specific merger deal. The average target firm CEO 
who received this benefit was awarded $3.3 million, but since only 
12% of target firm CEOs received an augmented parachute, the 
average payout for the entire population of target firm CEOs is 
$400,000 (= $3,300,000 x 0.12).31 
 
 26. See Hartzell, supra note 24, at 45. 
 27. Id. (finding that 69% of the CEOs in their sample had golden parachute arrangements 
in place at least a year prior to the acquisition. For tax reasons, the golden parachute payment is 
typically equal to three times the CEOs salary and bonus in the years prior to the deal. I.R.C. § 
280(G) (2012) limits corporate deductions for golden parachute payments to this amount). 
 28. See, e.g., Gillette Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) I-67 to I-68 (May 25, 2005) 
(describing equity awards and retention agreements given to four senior executives of Gillette in 
addition to the CEO, Mr. Kilts). 
 29. See infra notes 30–42 and accompanying text. 
 30. See Hartzell, supra note 24, at 46 (emphasis added) (“In these cases, boards vote to 
increase the CEO’s parachute value and shareholders learn of the change after the fact from an 
SEC filing; a little more than half of this subgroup did not have any parachute in place prior to 
the augmentation.”). 
 31. See id. 
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Second, target CEOs may receive payment from the acquirer for 
post-merger consulting or for signing a non-compete agreement.32 
Finance studies refer to such payments as “merger bonuses.”33 The 
average target firm CEO who received a merger bonus was awarded 
$4.4 million; this benefit was received by 27% of target firm CEOs, 
implying that the average merger bonus payout for the entire 
population of target firm CEOs is $1.2 million (i.e. 1,200,000 = 
4,400,000 x .27).34 
Third, the target board may grant unscheduled stock options to its 
CEO during merger negotiations.35 While option grants in other 
contexts can have incentivizing effects when awarded in connection 
with a merger proposal, such grants function as an alternative form of 
side payment. The average target firm CEO who received an 
unscheduled option during deal negotiations was awarded an extra 
$3.5 million; this benefit was received by 13% of target firm CEOs, 
implying that the average value of unscheduled options granted 
during deal negations for the entire population of target firm CEOs is 
$455,000 (= $3,500,000 x 0.13).36 
Fourth, many target CEOs receive either continued employment 
(50%) or a board seat (57%) with the acquiring firm.37 Such benefits 
are explicitly negotiated in connection with the M&A deal. As a 
prominent New York lawyer explained, “I have had a number of 
situations where we’ve gone to management looking to do a [merger] 
and been stopped at the door until a compensation arrangement was 
signed, sealed and delivered[.]”38 CEOs who are retained by the 
 
 32. Id. 
   33. Id. at 54. 
 34. See id. at 46 (calculated by multiplying $4,400,000 by 0.27); cf. Eliezer M. Fich, 
Edward M. Rice & Anh L. Tran, Contractual Revisions in Compensation: Evidence from Merger 
Bonuses to Target CEOs, 61 J. ACCT. & ECON. 338, 345 (2016) [hereinafter Fich, Contractual 
Revisions] (finding that 23% of target CEOs receive a merger bonus by using a larger dataset of 
M&A deals; the mean merger bonus payout in their study was $1.6 million).  
 35. Eliezer M. Fich, Jie Cai & Anh L. Tran, Stock Option Grants to Target CEOs During 
Private Merger  Negotiations, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 413, 419 (2011) [hereinafter Fich, 
Option Grants]. 
 36. Id. (finding, when using data from 920 acquisitions conducted from 1999 to 2007, 
that the rate of unscheduled option grants during merger negotiations (13%) is significantly 
higher than the baseline rate of unscheduled stock option grants (9%)). 
 37. See Hartzell, supra note 24, at 46–47. 
  38. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Executive Pay: A Special Report; Those Sweet Trips to the Merger 
Mall, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/07/
business/executive-pay-a-special-report-those-sweet-trips-to-the-merger-mall.html. 
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acquiring firm typically receive a larger salary (18% greater) and a 
larger bonus (34% greater) than they did with the target firm.39 
Conceptually, a CEO retention agreement should only be treated 
as a side payment to the extent that the executive is overpaid relative 
to any value she creates for the acquiring firm. Because the retained 
individual presumably adds value to the acquirer and the total benefits 
that the individual may receive under such agreement are unknown at 
closing, it is difficult to measure the side payment component of a 
retention agreement. Target CEOs who obtain a position as an officer 
of acquiring firms receive “about $4.7 million less in negotiated cash 
pay from golden parachute augmentations and special merger 
bonuses.”40 “These results imply that acquirers overtly pay certain 
CEOs to surrender managerial control over their firms’ assets, or 
equivalently, that some CEOs ‘purchase’ executive jobs in the buyer 
by foregoing cash payments that they might otherwise 
have obtained.”41 
Target CEOs generally receive either post-merger employment or 
a side payment.42 This suggests that the average CEO values continued 
employment at approximately $4.7 million. Though this figure may 
seem high, it is consistent with evidence that departed CEOs often do 
not find subsequent work, or find work at a substantially lower-paying 
job.43 Given that 50% of target CEOs receive continued employment, 
the mean value of continued employment for the full population of 
target-firm CEOs may be approximately $2.35 million (50% of 
$4.7 million). 
Putting this together, we can estimate the aggregate value of 
merger side payments for CEOs of publicly-held targets. Excluding 
the value of benefits received by CEOs retained by acquirers, the mean 
CEO receives just over $2 million in merger side payments. If we 
include acquirer retention agreements (valued as above), the mean 
CEO can expect approximately $4.3 million in merger side benefits. 
Either way merger side payments are an economically significant 
 
 39. Hartzell, supra note 24, at 48. Many of target CEOs do not stay with the acquirer for 
even a full year after the merger, and when they depart they typically receive a lucrative severance 
payment (mean of $3.8 million) from the acquirer. Id. at 49. 
 40. Id. at 54. 
 41. Id. at 39. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. at 49–55; Anup Agrawal & Ralph A. Walkling, Executive Careers and 
Compensation Surrounding Takeover Bids, 49 J. FIN. 985, 985–1014 (1994). 
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payout, larger than the average value paid out under pre-merger 
parachute arrangements ($1.4 million).44 These results are 
summarized in Table 1. 
Due to limited data availability for privately-held firms, there is less 
evidence on the use of merger side payments in private acquisitions. 
One exception to this is my own research with Jesse Fried.45 We used 
interviews to collect information related to the acquisition of 50 
venture-backed startups. We found that the CEO received a non-
retention merger bonus in 16 of the 50 acquisitions.46 For our full 
sample, the average merger bonus was approximately $0.5 million (or 
$1.6 million for the 16 deals that provide a merger bonus).47  In dollar 
terms, the merger bonuses that we find in private acquisitions are 
modest, at least as compared to public deals. However, when 
computed as a fraction of the acquisition price, these are large bonuses 
(for the 16 deals which provide a merger bonus, the bonus was 6.6% 
of the total sale price). We also found that top executives of the target 
firm were offered retention contracts in 38% of the acquisitions in our 
study.48 While the generalizability of our study—involving only VC-
backed startups—to all private acquisitions may be questioned, our 
research at least shows that merger side payments are not limited to 
public acquisitions and can be a significant source of compensation for 
executives of private as well as public targets. 
  
 
 44. See Hartzell, supra note 24, at 45. Hartzell et al. collect data from SEC filings made 
in connection with the sale of each of these firms.  This lets them measure various payouts that 
the CEO of the target firm receives in connection with the sale. Id. 
 45. Broughman & Fried, Carrots and Sticks, supra note 25. 
 46. See id. at 1351. 
 47. See id. at 1350. 
 48. See id. at 1351 n.91 (reporting that 19 founders (i.e. 38% of the 50 firm sample) 
received a retention agreement from the acquirer). 
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Table 1: Benefits Received by CEOs of Publicly-Held Targets49 
 
PRE-MERGER BENEFITS 
 
   
Type %  Mean $ Value Source 
Share gains  n/a 4,247,863 Hartzell, et. al. (2004) 
Option gains  n/a 656,451 Hartzell, et. al. (2004) 
Parachute  69.0 1,465,251 Hartzell, et. al. (2004) 
 
Total  $6,369,565  
 
MERGER SIDE PAYMENTS 
 
  
Type %  Mean $ Value     Source 
Monetary Benefits    
Augmentation of 
parachute  
12.1 393,545 Hartzell, et. al. (2004)                  
Additional bonus  27.2 1,201,011 Hartzell, et. al. (2004) 
Unscheduled 
Option  
13.0 455,000       Fich, et. al. (2011) 
    
Other Merger Benefits   
CEO retained as 
officer  
50.3 n/a Hartzell, et. al. (2004) 
CEO retained as 
director 
  
57.1 n/a Hartzell, et. al. (2004) 
Total (excluding 
retention) 
 
 $2,049,556  
Total (including 
retention)50 
 $4,349,556  
 
 
 49. Table 1 lists benefits––financial and otherwise—received by the CEO in connection 
with the sale of her firm. Data is from Hartzell, supra note 24, at 44–46 (including 311 
acquisitions involving publicly held firms from 1995 to 1997), and from Fich, Option Grants, 
supra note 35 (including 920 acquisitions involving publicly held firms from 1999 to 2007). 
 50. For a discussion of the value of continued employment, see supra note 40–43 and 
accompanying text. 
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III. TWO EXPLANATIONS: INCENTIVE ALIGNMENT AND RENT 
EXTRACTION 
More difficult than showing the existence of merger side payments 
is determining whether target shareholders benefit from these 
arrangements. This Part considers two alternative explanations for the 
frequent use of merger side payments: incentive alignment and 
rent extraction. 
A. Incentive Alignment 
A side payment may benefit shareholders by countering 
managerial resistance to an efficient sale. To illustrate, consider the 
following hypothetical. 
Suppose Target has 10 million shares outstanding that are 
currently trading for $40/share (market cap = $400 million). Acquirer 
is considering buying Target for strategic purposes. Due to expected 
synergies, Acquirer would be willing to pay up to $500 million for 
Target, producing a net gain in social welfare equal to $100 million. 
Though not technically required, assume a deal—and the 
accompanying social gain—can only go forward with the support of 
the CEO of Target. The CEO will support an acquisition only if it is 
in her personal interest to do so. As is typical, the CEO is the primary 
party negotiating the deal on behalf of Target and if she threatens to 
hold up the deal, the parties believe that considerable value would be 
lost. Consequently, Acquirer is only interested in buying Target with 
the CEO’s support.51 
Suppose the CEO holds 1% (100,000 shares) of Target’s 
outstanding equity, currently valued at $4 million (100,000 x 
$40/share). The CEO also values her job. Assume a $3 million 
buyout is the minimum payment that the CEO would voluntarily 
accept to give up her employment position at Target. This figure 
reflects the marginal value to the CEO of her job (including future 
compensation, private benefits, status, etc.) relative to her next best 
employment opportunity. Putting her share value together with her 
 
 51. Alternatively, we could instead assume that a deal remains possible, but that Acquirer 
would only be willing to pay a smaller amount if a deal is done without the CEO’s support. This 
may limit the magnitude of side payment that a CEO can bargain for, since Acquirer could 
threaten to do the deal without the CEO if the CEO makes unreasonable demands. Nonetheless, 
the basic intuition regarding incentive alignment remains valid because the CEO could still hold 
up the deal to the extent that it is worth more with her cooperation. 
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employment value, the CEO will only support a sale if she receives at 
least $7 million from the deal. This follows since the sale will require 
the CEO to give up both her equity holdings (worth $4 million) and 
her job (worth $3 million). The benefit to the CEO could come from 
either (i) the price offered to Target shareholders (i.e., the merger 
premium), or (ii) from a side payment offered to the CEO. For ease 
of analysis, I assume the CEO is not entitled to a golden parachute.52 
Given this setup, we can explore the effect of side payments on 
merger negotiations. Without a side payment, the only benefit that 
the CEO receives from a sale is the premium offered for her shares. 
The shareholder premium, however, would need to be very large to 
compensate the CEO for giving up her job. In the current example, 
the CEO would need to receive $7 million for her 1% equity interest 
in Target, meaning Acquirer would need to pay $700 million (or 
$70/share) for the entire company. Unfortunately, Acquirer only 
values Target at $500 million. At this price, the CEO would only 
receive $5 million for her equity. Without a side payment the CEO 
will block the sale of Target. The result is entrenchment. Society loses 
out on the $100 million surplus that a sale would create. 
It is easy to see that a merger side payment could solve this 
problem. For example, a side payment equal to exactly $3 million 
would fully compensate the CEO for giving up her job, and align the 
CEO’s incentives with those of shareholders. With this side payment, 
the CEO’s marginal welfare in any merger negotiations would depend 
solely on the price paid to Target shareholders. This is also the 
standard justification for golden parachutes. The idea is to remove the 
entrenchment motive by fully compensating the CEO for her loss of 
position, and thereby encourage the CEO to focus on 
shareholder welfare. 
In the current example, a $3 million side payment makes an 
acquisition possible. For instance, Acquirer may offer to buy Target 
for $480 million (or $48/share) and give CEO a $3 million side 
payment. Acquirer would be paying a total of $483 million for a 
company that it values at $500 million. The CEO would receive $7.8 
million in total benefits from the deal ($3 million side payment plus 
$4.8 million for her equity), giving her a small gain relative to her 
 
 52. Furthermore, for simplification, I assume Acquirer would not receive any extra value 
from getting the CEO to sign a retention agreement or a non-compete agreement. Put 
differently, Acquirer simply needs to get the CEO to support the sale, but the structure of any 
side payment offered to the CEO does not impact merger surplus. 
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prior status; and Target shareholders would receive a 20% merger 
premium, a gain of $80 million ($480 million compared to $400 
million market cap). To be sure, a small portion of the merger surplus 
($3 million) is necessarily being redirected to the CEO, but compared 
to no deal this is a definite improvement for Target shareholders,53 and 
it preserves the social benefit created by the acquisition. 
Some may find this explanation of incentive alignment troubling 
because it includes payments for conduct that a CEO acting on 
shareholders’ behalf ought to perform regardless of financial 
incentives. At least in spirit, fiduciary obligations suggest that the 
CEO ought to support a sale of Target whenever it is in the best 
interests of Target shareholders. In response, it should be noted that 
the CEO’s conflict is unusual in that serving the shareholder interest 
could mean giving up her personal livelihood. Outside of corporate 
law, fiduciary relationships do not generally require the agent to 
sacrifice her career for fiduciary ends.54 Furthermore, while blocking 
an acquisition may be against the spirit of fiduciary law, it is difficult 
to enforce this obligation in the M&A context. Management could 
always claim that the reason they are blocking the sale is that the price 
offered to target shareholders is too low.55 Given the various methods 
of valuing a business56 and the wide degree of discretion afforded 
management in opposing a takeover, this defense is difficult for an 
objecting shareholder to overcome. Thus, even if extracting a merger 
 
 53. Indeed, the CEO’s loss of $3 million in private benefits by giving up her job should 
be included in a full social-welfare analysis, meaning this hypothetical merger only creates $97 
million in true social gain, all of which is going to the shareholders—$17 million to the Acquirer 
shareholders (in the form of savings on the transaction purchase price) and $80 million to Target 
shareholders. The $3 million side payment is merely compensating for the CEO’s loss of 
private benefits. 
 54. For example, employees are agents of their employer and consequently owe fiduciary 
obligations to the employer.  Yet, an employee is not obligated to cease working for the employer 
based on belief that someone else may be more qualified for the job. 
 55. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949–53 (Del. 1985) 
(discussing where the target board rejected the acquirer’s two-tiered tender offer, finding, after 
deliberating reasonably and in good faith, that the offer was coercive and inadequate); see also 
Miguel Helft & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Yahoo Rejects Microsoft Bid Again, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/07/technology/07cnd-soft.html?_r=0 (reporting 
that Yahoo rejected Microsoft’s second takeover offer, deeming the bid to be insufficient). 
 56. Various methodologies for valuing a business include (without limitation): discounted 
cash-flow analysis, comparable company analysis, comparable transaction analysis, ratio analysis, 
asset valuation, and weighted-average approaches.  For a discussion of such methodologies in 
the context of appraisal litigation, see Rutherford B. Campbell Jr., The Impact of Modern Finance 
Theory in Acquisition Cases, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 13–18 (2003). 
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side payment may seem improper, practically speaking it makes sense 
to think of the payment as serving an incentive alignment function. 
Empirical studies suggest that side payments are indeed used for 
incentive alignment. Side payments arise more often in settings where 
the CEO’s loss of private benefits creates heightened incentives to 
otherwise block the merger.57 For example, if the Target CEO is not 
retained or her employment agreement provides below average 
change of control benefits, she is more likely to receive a merger side 
payment, and the value of such payment will be larger.58 Merger side 
payments may “act as a form of ex-post settling up . . . whereby target 
CEOs are made whole for the benefits they lose when firms are sold.”59 
According to estimates from Fich, Rice, and Tran, “a $1 decline in the 
parachute payment raises the [merger] bonus by $0.67.”60 One 
interpretation consistent with such data is that CEOs with inadequate 
change-of-control protection require a larger side payment to align 
their incentives with those of shareholders.61 Collectively, these results 
suggest that side payments are often used to overcome managerial 
entrenchment that could otherwise derail an acquisition.62 
B. Rent Extraction 
A side payment can be understood as a renegotiation of the CEO’s 
employment contract. In the contract theory literature, renegotiation 
 
 57. See Hartzell supra note 24, at 40; see infra notes 57–61 and accompanying text. 
 58. See Hartzell, supra note 24, at 39 (“[W]e find strong inverse associations between 
[side payments] and the likelihood that the target CEO remains as an officer of the acquirer.”); 
see also Fich, Contractual Revisions, supra note 34, at 365 (explaining that in low synergy targets, 
side payments provide an adjustment to the compensation received by target CEOs in takeovers). 
Also, there is some evidence that merger side payments are positively correlated with prior 
excess compensation. 
 59. See Hartzell, supra note 24, at 39 (citing Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the 
Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 288 (1980)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 60. See Fich, Contractual Revisions, supra note 34, at 347. 
 61. Id. at 339, 341 (explaining side payments “may resolve the potential conflict of 
interest between the CEO and shareholders. In this situation, an extra cash benefit provided 
during an acquisition attempt can move the target CEO to support and enable a deal the CEO 
would otherwise oppose.”). 
 62. As further evidence of this, even with widespread use of side payments, shareholders 
of target firms as opposed to acquirers appear to capture almost all of the gains associated with 
merger activity. See Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford, supra note 18, at 110 (showing that target 
firm shareholders receive all of the economic gains associated with merger activity and acquiring 
shareholders receive no benefit and in some periods even receive negative returns). 
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is a standard solution to holdup problems.63 Provided the parties are 
not constrained by wealth, renegotiation will ensure an ex post 
efficient outcome.64 Renegotiation, however, may have distributive 
consequences, and can lead to inefficient investment behavior ex 
ante.65 Applied to the current context, the parties use a form of 
Coasian bargaining to negotiate around the CEO’s holdup, ensuring 
efficient ownership of the Target firm.66 The side payments needed to 
reach this result, will lead to a redistribution of merger surplus away 
from Target shareholders and to the benefit of the Target CEO (and 
possibly the Acquirer). 
In the hypothetical in Section III.A, the merger surplus is not 
redistributed because it is assumed that the CEO will simply receive 
the minimum side payment necessary to achieve incentive alignment. 
But this need not be the case. Indeed, the CEO and Acquirer have an 
incentive to collude in the design of the side payment and pricing of 
the merger. This incentive occurs because for each additional dollar 
paid to Target shareholders, the CEO only receives $0.01 (her 1% pro 
rata interest). By contrast, the CEO receives 100% (minus taxes) of 
each dollar allocated as a side payment. The Acquirer can obtain the 
CEO’s consent at a much lower cost by allocating more of the funds 
to the side payment and less to the Target shareholders. The parties, 
of course, cannot set the merger price so low that Target shareholders 
might reject the offer, but they can capture a larger portion of 
the surplus. 
To illustrate with an example, consider the following extension of 
the hypothetical. Instead of a $3 million side payment, the Acquirer 
could offer a $13 million side payment in exchange for lowering the 
purchase price from $480 million to $460 million. These terms make 
both Acquirer and Target CEO better off, as compared to the 
arrangement above. The CEO now gets $17.6 million, as compared 
 
 63. See Brian Broughman, Investor Opportunism, and Governance in Venture Capital, in 
VENTURE CAPITAL: INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, STRUCTURES, AND POLICIES 347, 350 (Douglas 
Cumming ed., 2010) (discussing the use of renegotiation as a solution to problems created by 
opportunism and ex post hold-up). 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON., Oct. 1960, at 
1, 1–44. In the current example, the CEO of the target firm has something akin to a property 
right over the assets of the target firm, suggesting that the CEO’s consent is needed to transfer 
these assets to the acquirer. 
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to $7.8 million above,67 and Acquirer pays a total of $473 million 
instead of $483 million. Target shareholders are the only group 
harmed by this arrangement; instead of $480 million they now receive 
$460 million. The quid pro quo in this bargain may not be explicit, as 
counterfactual offers may not be observed. Nonetheless, it is easy to 
see how a CEO’s bargaining incentives may be compromised by a 
large side payment. 
Table 2 provides a summary of the expected payoffs to each party 
under the various arrangements described above. The first row shows 
that without a side payment there is no merger and the parties fail to 
capture any benefit. The last two rows show the division of merger 
surplus under the two hypothetical deals described above. To avoid 
double counting, the last column excludes the CEO’s payoff as 
shareholder, and only counts the value of the side payment minus the 
loss of the CEO’s current job at Target. 
 
Table 2: Merger Payoffs with Alternative Side Payments 
 
  Marginal Payoff to Each Party 
Side 
Payment 
Merger 
Price 
Acquirer Target 
SHs 
Target 
CEO 
None Deal 
blocked 
0 0 0 
$3M $480M $17M $80M 0 
$13M $460M $27M $60M $10M 
 
Empirical studies of side payments find evidence of rent extraction. 
Numerous studies find that the premium offered to target 
shareholders is significantly lower in deals where the target CEO 
receives either a side payment or post-merger employment.68 In a 
 
 67. The CEO receives $4.6 million for her 1% equity interest, plus a $13 million 
side payment. 
 68. Numerous publications establish evidence that side payments lead to a lower 
premium. See, e.g., Fich, Option Grants, supra note 35; Hartzell, supra note 24; Buhui Qiu, 
Svetoslav Trapkov & Fadi Yakoub, Do Target CEOs Trade Premiums for Personal Benefits?, 42 J. 
BANKING & FIN., May 2014, at 23. Additionally, several studies evidence that post-merger 
employment leads to a lower premium. See, e.g., Hartzell, supra note 24; Qiu, Trapkov & 
Yakoub, supra 68; Julie Wulf, Do CEOs in Mergers Trade Power for Premium? Evidence from 
“Mergers of Equals,” 20 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 60 (2004). But see Leonce L. Bargeron, Frederik P. 
Schlingemann, René M. Stulz & Chad J. Zutter, Do Target CEOs Sell Out Their Shareholders to 
Keep Their Job in a Merger? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14724, 2009), 
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recent finance study, for example, the authors found that target 
shareholders receive a 5% lower merger premium when the CEO is 
offered employment by the acquirer.69 Similarly, “targets granting 
their CEOs unscheduled stock options while confidential merger talks 
are in progress earn acquisition premiums about 4.4 percentage points 
lower.”70 Furthermore, side payments cost target shareholders more 
than they benefit the target CEO,71 suggesting that target CEOs are 
in essence colluding with the acquirer to redistribute a portion of 
target shareholder gains between them.72 
The existence of lower merger premium in deals that involve a side 
payment or CEO retention does not necessarily imply rent extraction. 
It may be that side payments are endogenous to low-quality targets 
and deals with low-potential synergies. A buyer can offer a larger 
shareholder premium as the merger surplus (i.e. synergy) increases. 
Consequently, in an acquisition that creates a large surplus, the CEO 
may support the deal even without a side payment because the 
premium applied to her equity holdings fully compensates her for the 
loss of her job. Conversely, if an acquisition involves a small surplus 
the opposite is true and a side payment may now be necessary to 
obtain the CEO’s support. Consistent with this, one type of side 
payment—merger bonuses—is more common in deals with a low 
merger synergy.73 The low synergy explanation, however, does not 
apply to other types of merger side payments.74 In a study that 
addresses the endogeneity of CEO retention, Qiu, Trapkov, and 
 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14724 (finding that post-merger employment does not lead to 
a lower merger premium). Another refinement on this basic result comes from Hartzell, supra 
note 24, at 58 (finding evidence that target CEOs holding less than the median amount of equity 
in the target firm are more likely to sacrifice equity appreciation for personal benefit). This result 
suggests that a CEO’s pre-merger equity holdings can serve as a partial constraint on 
rent extraction. 
 69. See Qiu, Trapkov & Yakoub, supra note 68, at 28. 
 70. Fich, Option Grants, supra note 35, at 414. 
 71. See generally Fich, Option Grants, supra note 35; Hartzell, supra note 24; Qiu, 
Trapkov & Yakoub, supra note 68; Wulf, supra note 68. 
 72. Fich, Option Grants, supra note 35, at 414 (finding that “[d]eal value is reduced by 
almost $62 for every $1 of profit target CEOs obtain from unscheduled stock options.”). But 
see Shane Heitzman, Equity Grants to Target CEOs During Deal Negotiations, 102 J. FIN. ECON. 
251–52 (2011) (finding no evidence of rent extraction through side payments). 
 73. See generally Fich, Contractual Revisions, supra note 34, at 338. 
 74. See generally Fich, Option Grants, supra note 35 (discussing unscheduled stock 
options to target CEOs in mergers); Hartzell, supra note 24 (examining the benefits received 
by target CEOs in completed mergers and acquisitions). 
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Yakoub still find a strong negative correlation between CEO retention 
and merger premium, suggesting that this result is not driven by 
selection bias.75 Rather, retained CEOs do not seem to bargain as 
aggressively on behalf of target shareholders.76 
More problematic, acquirers capture a larger fraction of the 
merger surplus in deals that involve a merger bonus or an unscheduled 
option grant.77 
[T]he financial cost to target shareholders of [merger side payments] 
would seem to exceed substantially the benefits received by their 
CEOs. This imbalance, arising from a conflict of interest between 
target CEOs and their shareholders, would seem to represent a 
wealth transfer from shareholders of the target to shareholders of 
the buyer.78 
Similarly, “bidder returns involving a target that issues its CEO 
unscheduled stock options during private deal negotiations are about 
2 percentage points higher.”79 Consistent with rent extraction, these 
results suggest a wealth transfer from target shareholders to both the 
target CEO and to acquiring shareholders. 
The puzzle with rent extraction is to understand why a target’s 
shareholders would vote to approve a merger that gives money away 
to the CEO. In the M&A context, side payments are disclosed to 
shareholders and the entire transaction is subject to both board and 
shareholder approval.80 Informed shareholder approval generally 
mitigates concern related to conflicts of interest. Given these 
procedural safeguards, why do empirical studies of merger side 
payments nonetheless find evidence of rent extraction? 
The existing literature does not have a good answer to this 
question. None of the finance studies discussed above explicitly 
 
 75. See Qiu, Trapkov & Yakoub, supra note 68, at 10–17 (discussing the possibility of 
selection bias due to the fact that only non-retained CEOs receive severance pay). 
   76. Id. at 26–27. 
 77. See generally Fich, Option Grants, supra note 35; Hartzell, supra note 24. 
 78. Hartzell, supra note 24, at 59. 
 79. Fich, Option Grants, supra note 35, at 415 (finding this result only applies to merger 
bonuses and unscheduled option grants). But see Eliezer M. Fich, Micah Officer & Anh L. Tran, 
Do Acquirers Benefit from Retaining Target CEOs? (June 13, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://22financeforum.unizar.es/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/22financeforum_submissio
n_66_Do-acquirers-benefit-from-retaining-target-CEOs.pdf (finding that “acquirers do not 
appear to benefit, in terms of merger announcement returns or long-run operating performance 
from hiring the CEO of firms they acquire.”). 
 80. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 50. 
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consider the approval process necessary to enter into a merger.81 
Rather, they treat rent extraction via side payments as just another 
agency cost, perhaps caused by board capture.82 This explanation, 
however, is better suited for the general discussion of managerial 
decision making, where shareholders are not entitled to a formal 
vote.83 The next Part provides a new theory of rent extraction that 
does not depend on board capture and explains why shareholder 
voting, as currently exercised, cannot be relied on to prevent 
opportunistic side payments. 
IV. NEW THEORY: BUNDLING SIDE PAYMENTS INTO MERGERS 
Target CEOs can use a form of agenda-setting power to bundle an 
opportunistic side payment into a merger transaction that is desired 
by shareholders. By bundling the side payment into a single yes-or-no 
merger vote, management makes it impossible for target shareholders 
to oppose the side payment without also voting against the merger. 
Provided the bundled deal is better than the status quo (i.e. no 
merger), shareholders will rationally vote in favor of the entire 
transaction.84 Thus, even if shareholders or directors would not have 
approved the side payment if structured as a pre-merger golden 
parachute, it is likely to receive shareholder support as part of a take-
it-or-leave-it merger vote. 
 
   81. See Fich, Option Grants, supra note 35; Hartzell, supra note 24; Heitzman, supra 
note 72; Qiu, Trapkov & Yakoub, supra note 68; Wulf, supra note 68. 
 82. There is a lack of theory work (i.e. formal models) specifically related to merger side 
payments. Empiricists are consequently drawing on theories developed in related contexts (e.g. 
executive compensation, golden parachutes, etc.) even though these settings differ from merger 
side payments in important ways. For example, studies often cite to LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE 
FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION (2004), for evidence of rent extraction in executive compensation. 
 83. While legal scholars generally pay much more attention to the process by which 
corporate decisions are authorized, they have almost completely overlooked the issue of merger 
side payments. 
 84. Glencore’s efforts to acquire Xstrata illustrate this problem. See Steven Davidoff 
Solomon, Gamesmanship in Xstrata-Glencore Merger Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2012), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/10/25/gamesmanship-in-xstrata-glencore-merger-vote
/?_r=0. The initial deal proposal included approximately $275 million in retention bonuses to 
Xstrata management. Id. After deciding that Xstrata’s CEO, Mick Davis, would no longer head 
the business post-merger, the proposed retention bonuses were reduced by $75 million, to an 
aggregate bonus of $200 million, but shareholders remained upset. Id. Xstrata added a 
shareholder-voting item on the retention bonuses, but it did not appear to give shareholders a 
meaningful ability to oppose the side payments without also blocking the entire deal. See id. 
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Originating in the political science literature,85 bundling has 
received attention from corporate law scholars.86 Bundling has been 
used to explain shareholder approval of dual-class recapitalizations in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s87 and, more recently, shareholder 
approval of mergers where the surviving entity includes a staggered 
board provision in its charter.88 The general claim is that management 
can bundle a provision that shareholders would normally oppose (e.g. 
a staggered board) with a “sweetener” that shareholders desire.89 This 
Article extends the bundling insight to the analysis of merger side 
payments and provides a theory to explain evidence of rent extraction 
associated with such payouts.  
 The existing literature in corporate law focuses primarily on the 
vulnerability of shareholders to bundled transactions. As described by 
 
 85. See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 219 (1990) 
(discussing bundling in the passage of a tax reform bill). See generally Michael D. Gilbert, Single 
Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803, 808–09 (2006) (finding that 
legislative compromises need to be bundled to improve political transparency); Kenneth A. 
Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV., Mar. 1987, at 85–104 (investigating why legislative committees are powerful and their 
role as agenda setters). 
 86. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 833, 864–65 (2005) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Shareholder Power] (discussing the impact of 
bundling on reincorporation and charter amendment decisions); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 
Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 
105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1475 (1992) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Federalism] (examining the impact 
of bundling on approval of proposals for reincorporation); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting 
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1839–40 (1989) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom] 
(discussing shareholder decisions in voting on bundled amendments); Lucian A. Bebchuk & 
Ehud Kamar, Bundling and Entrenchment, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1549, 1555–59 (2010) 
[hereinafter Bebchuk & Kamar] (summarizing the literature on bundling in corporate law); 
K.A.D. Camara, Shareholder Voting and the Bundling Problem in Corporate Law, 2004 WIS. L. 
REV. 1425 (generally addressing the bundling issue); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory 
Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1577–79 (1989) [hereinafter Gordon, 
Structure of Corporate Law] (examining bundling incentives); Andrew C.W. Lund, Say on Pay’s 
Bundling Problems, 99 KY. L.J. 119, 143–49 (2010–2011) (discussing the impact that the federal 
“Say on Pay” rule has on bundling). But see Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: 
The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1599, 1612 (1989) 
(reviewing Gordon, Structure of Corporate Law, supra note 86) (suggesting that bundling does 
not suggest coercion because shareholders will only approve of an outcome that is better than 
the status quo). 
 87. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of 
Shareholder Choice, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 48 (1988) [hereinafter Gordon, Ties that Bond]. 
 88. See Bebchuk & Kamar, supra note 86, at 1552–53 (examining the impact on bundling 
staggered board amendments with mergers to garner shareholder support). 
 89. Id.; Gordon, Ties that Bond, supra note 87, at 48. 
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Bebchuk and Kamar, “[o]nly the board is authorized under state 
corporate law to bring proposals for fundamental changes before 
shareholders for approval. Shareholders lack parallel authority to 
propose these changes and must vote on the board’s proposals on an 
up-or-down basis.”90 The shareholder position is analogous to the 
inability of legislators to amend a bill coming out of committee under 
a closed rule, which is exactly the setting in which political scientists 
believe legislative riders are most problematic.91 Provided the target’s 
board is willing to endorse a side payment for its CEO, the 
shareholders are stuck: unable to amend the merger agreement and 
forced into a take-it-or-leave-it vote. 
A. Bundling with an Independent Board 
The above account of shareholder vulnerability implicitly treats 
the target board of directors as a rubber stamp for the deal negotiated 
by its CEO. There is certainly plenty of reason to believe that the 
board may be favorably inclined toward the CEO. Some of the 
directors may be corporate insiders working for the CEO, others may 
have been nominated by the CEO, or they may favor the CEO due to 
various forms of structural bias.92 Furthermore, in the acquisition 
context, it is not uncommon for target directors to receive a side 
benefit themselves (e.g. a board seat with the acquirer)93 in connection 
with the deal. 
But what if this is not the case? What if the directors on target’s 
board are truly independent of the CEO, and motivated to act in 
shareholder interests? Even with an independent board, there remains 
some risk of rent extraction through merger side payments. Targets 
generally rely on their CEO to negotiate the merger agreement.94 This 
position gives the CEO considerable discretion to negotiate personal 
benefits into the agreement that is sent to the board. 
 
 90. Bebchuk & Kamar, supra note 86, at 1557 (footnotes omitted). 
 91. See Gilbert, supra note 85, at 842–43. 
 92. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and Structural 
Bias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833, 834 (2007) (describing structural bias as bias that arises because of 
“the cozy relationship [that] directors may have with officers . . . .”). 
 93. See generally Mira Ganor, Salvaged Directors or Perpetual Thrones?, 5 VA. L. & BUS. 
REV. 267, 269 (2010). 
 94. See Heitzman, supra note 72, at 257 (finding evidence that the CEO had authority 
to negotiate on behalf of the target firm in more than half of the observations acquisitions). 
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To be sure, instead of letting the CEO negotiate the merger 
agreement, a board could appoint a special committee of independent 
directors or other outside parties to negotiate on behalf of target 
shareholders. Indeed, special negotiating committees are sometimes 
used.95 Their primary use, however, appears to be limited to 
management buy-outs (MBOs) or other transactions involving roll-
over equity plans for target managers.96 In an MBO, the target 
management team is effectively the acquirer—often with support of a 
private equity firm—buying out the target’s prior shareholders. 
Because of this conflict, in the context of an MBO, it does not make 
sense for target managers to negotiate on behalf of the target firm; 
thus the board forms a special negotiating committee. 
The special committee will typically retain an investment to assist 
it and is also likely to conduct auctions to try to find an alternative 
acquirer.97 In some auction deals, a special committee is used because 
management is one of the bidders for the target firm, even though the 
ultimate acquirer is unrelated to management.98 Extending this logic, 
special committees could be used to deal with the conflict raised by 
side payments even when there is no prospect of an MBO. This use of 
the special committee, however, appears unusual. Using data from 
public acquisitions that includes a large number of private equity deals, 
Boone and Mulherin find that 24% of all acquisitions use a special 
committee; however, when MBOs and private equity deals are 
excluded, special committees remain infrequent.99 
Why don’t more boards appoint a special committee to negotiate 
their sales? One reason, of course, is that some boards may effectively 
be captured by their CEOs. But even for target boards acting in 
shareholder interest, there is plenty of reason to rely on the CEO as a 
primary negotiator. Boone and Mulherin, for example, suggest that 
special committees may be at a disadvantage in settings where insider 
 
 95. See Audra L. Boone & J. Harold Mulherin, Who Monitors the Monitor? The Use of 
Special Committees by Target Firms in Corporate Takeovers, J. CORP. FIN. 3 (forthcoming 2014), 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119914000133. 
 96. See id. at 5. 
 97. See id. at 3. 
 98. See id. at 5. 
 99. See id. (showing that 58% of private equity deals and 42% of acquisitions by a private 
bidder (which includes MBOs) use a special negotiating committee, while acquisitions by a 
public acquirer only use a special negotiating committee in 9% (stock deals) to 20% (cash deals) 
of the observed deals). 
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knowledge is particularly valuable and can more easily be 
communicated by the CEO.100 Also, the appointment of a special 
committee in settings that do not involve an MBO may be insulting 
to the target CEO and may undermine management’s overall 
cooperation in the transition process, possibly destroying value. 
Keeping the CEO invested in the process through the completion 
of the deal may be the best way to get a high price and preserve value 
for the target shareholders. One way to ensure the CEO’s involvement 
is to let her negotiate the deal. Conversely, if the CEO leaves prior to 
closing or otherwise becomes uncooperative during negotiations, this 
could destroy a great deal of the firm’s value to the acquirer. The 
CEO’s holdup power makes it especially hard and costly for the board 
to replace her as primary negotiator on behalf of the firm. The CEO 
can use such holdup power to bargain for personal benefits.101 
With respect to shareholders, the CEO’s agenda-setting power is 
formal, in that shareholders cannot initiate fundamental 
transactions.102 With respect to the board, the CEO’s agenda-setting 
power is informal, based on the CEO’s ability to hold up a transaction 
if her demands are not met. Unlike shareholders, a board can suggest 
amendments to a merger agreement, but it cannot, while acting in 
shareholders’ interest, credibly threaten to scuttle a merger deal 
desired by shareholders simply to remove extra side payments. Rather, 
the board needs to believe that it would get a better deal for its 
shareholders by sending the CEO back to the bargaining table to ask 
for a higher price. 
To illustrate the problem, consider the following example: the 
CEO of a target firm negotiates both (i) a merger agreement that 
includes a 30% premium for target shareholders, and (ii) a personal 
retention agreement which promises substantially higher pay—both 
equity and salary—than she received under her previous employment 
contract. Target’s board may believe that its CEO is being offered a 
larger retention package than her marginal value to the acquiring firm 
and thus infer that the acquirer would have been willing to pay a 
 
 100. See id. at 6. 
 101. To be sure, holdup power does not imply that the target CEO has unilateral control 
over side payments. At a minimum, she must obtain the acquirer’s consent to a side payment. 
However, the acquirer has an incentive to go along with such arrangements, provided it 
receives a corresponding reduction in the price that it must pay to the target shareholders. 
Empirical studies, as discussed above, find evidence that this tradeoff indeed occurs. See supra 
notes 68–78. 
 102. See Bebchuk & Kamar, supra note 86, at 1557. 
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higher merger premium to target shareholders if the CEO’s retention 
agreement were scaled back to a reasonable level.  
But since the target board has no voice in the negotiation of the 
retention agreement, how can it use this information? In theory, the 
target board could try to demand a higher share price and ask its CEO 
to give up some of her personal benefits if necessary to get the desired 
price. Such demand, however, may be perceived as interfering with 
the CEO’s ability to negotiate future employment. Worse still, if a 30% 
premium is better than any alternative bidder is willing to offer, the 
board cannot credibly threaten to vote down the existing 
merger proposal. 
The disagreement between the board and the CEO becomes a 
game of brinksmanship, except one where the benefit of holding out 
accrues primarily to the CEO, and the cost of a negotiation 
breakdown falls primarily on diffuse shareholders.103 All parties—the 
target CEO, the board, and target shareholders—want the deal to go 
forward. The board’s threat to block the deal because of the side 
payment is not credible, but neither is the CEO’s threat to be 
uncooperative if she does not receive the rent extracting payment. 
Recognizing this dynamic, the board and the CEO can cooperate and 
split the merger surplus between them in some way. This has the effect 
of transferring shareholder surplus to the CEO. 
In this setting, a shareholder-motivated board may simply 
acquiesce to the CEO’s demands, especially recognizing that further 
merger negotiation is costly and could cause the proposed deal to fall 
apart. An independent board of directors may limit the extent of CEO 
rent extraction compared to a board captured by the CEO, but as long 
as the CEO remains the primary deal negotiator, even an independent 
 
 103. In governance conflicts where there are focused benefits and diffuse costs to an action, 
it is often argued that collective action problems will hinder the larger and less organized group 
and favor the smaller group. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE 
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). The analogy does not extend 
perfectly to merger side payments, since the board can act as a representative of the diffuse 
shareholders. Nonetheless, there is a single CEO who captures 100% of the benefits from a 
merger side payment, negotiating against a board with multiple directors, none of whom 
personally capture 100% of the marginal benefit that they create for shareholders by aggressively 
challenging the CEO’s side payment and obtaining a higher acquisition premium. In this setting, 
it is likely that an independent board of directors will acquiesce to some degree of rent extraction. 
For an analysis of collective action problems that shareholders face in bundled transactions, see 
Gordon, Structure of Corporate Law, supra note 86, at 1575–77; Gordon, Ties that Bond, supra 
note 87, at 42–47. 
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board cannot wholly prevent rent extraction. The CEO effectively 
presents a bundled deal both to the shareholders and to the board of 
directors. For the same reason that the shareholders are inclined to 
vote in favor of the transaction—it is better than the status quo—so 
too will the board. 
This example emphasizes a second contribution this Article makes 
to the literature on bundling in corporate law. As I hope to show, the 
risk of rent extraction through merger side payments does not require 
a captured board of directors. The problem of bundling is orthogonal 
to standard debates about executive compensation104 and debates in 
corporate governance regarding director primacy105 versus shareholder 
empowerment.106 Even if one believes that boards can generally do a 
good job setting CEO pay, one should be concerned about boards’ 
ability to prevent rent extraction through merger side payments. Rent 
extraction may reflect the CEO’s agenda-setting power in merger 
negotiations, rather than board capture. 
 
 104. The academic literature is split on whether boards are sufficiently independent from 
the CEO to engage in optimal contracting on behalf of shareholders or whether executive 
compensation terms are captured by managerial power. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1626–43 (2005) (reviewing 
LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004)); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & 
David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002); BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 82; Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
Executive Compensation: If There’s a Problem, What’s the Remedy? The Case for “Compensation 
Discussion and Analysis,” 30 J. CORP. L. 675, 683–87 (2005); Steven N. Kaplan, Are U.S. CEOs 
Overpaid?, 22 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP., May 2008, at 1, 5; Steven N. Kaplan, Executive 
Compensation and Corporate Governance in the U.S.: Perceptions, Facts and Challenges, (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18395, Sept. 2012), http://www
.nber.org/papers/w18395.pdf. 
 105. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 
IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (2002); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: 
Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2002); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director 
Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003); Stephen 
M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 
(2006); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 789 (2007). 
 106. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. 
LAW. 43 (2003); Bebchuk, Shareholder Power, supra note 86; Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting 
Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784 (2006); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder 
Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998); D. Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright & Marcus Kai 
Hintze, Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 125 (2011). 
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B. Side Payments vs. Golden Parachutes 
The focus on bundling also highlights an important, but 
overlooked, distinction between golden parachutes and merger side 
payments. Golden parachutes are not bundled into a specific merger 
transaction. Rather, parachutes are part of the CEO’s employment 
contract and are negotiated at the time she is hired.107 Ideally, a 
parachute should compensate the CEO for private benefits that may 
be lost if the firm is acquired and should align the CEO’s interests 
with those of shareholders regarding a sale of the firm. This, of course, 
is basically the incentive alignment hypothesis for side payments.108 To 
be sure, a captured board of directors may harm shareholders by 
awarding the CEO an excessive parachute payout, suggesting that rent 
extraction is also possible via golden parachutes.109 A board controlled 
by the CEO increases the risk of CEO rent extraction through side 
payments, parachutes, and various other forms of executive 
compensation.110 However, merger bundling only applies to side 
payments. Thus, to the extent that bundling is an independent cause 
of rent extraction, we should see higher levels of rent extraction 
through side payments as opposed to golden parachutes. 
Though this prediction has not been tested, there are a number of 
studies showing that shareholders benefit from golden parachutes. 
First, some studies find that shareholders experience positive abnormal 
 
 107. Legally, a golden parachute is a provision in an executive’s employment contract that 
entitles the executive to a payment in the event of a change-in-control (defined to include a sale) 
of the executive’s firm.  For a discussion of when golden parachutes should be negotiated, see 
Barbara Becker & Eduardo Gallardo, Golden Parachute Compensation Practice Pointers, HARV. 
L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGULATION (Aug. 2, 2013), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/08/02/golden-parachute-compensation-practice-po
inters/. Golden parachutes may be periodically renegotiated based on changed circumstances. 
 108. See supra Section III.A. 
 109. Like side payments, golden parachutes are open to multiple interpretations. Because 
a golden parachute compensates the CEO for the loss of her job, she will support a sale at a 
lower price. On the one hand, this may benefit target shareholders by reducing the entrenchment 
motive and increasing the likelihood that a sale will occur. On the other hand, a golden parachute 
may lower the CEO’s bargaining power relative to the acquirer. The acquirer knows the CEO 
has a golden parachute and it anticipates that she will accept a lower merger premium. Thus, the 
acquirer may be able to get a better price and capture a larger portion of the merger surplus 
when negotiating with a CEO protected by a golden parachute.  See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, 
Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders, J. CORP. 
FIN., Apr. 2014, at 140, 140–41 (describing tradeoffs associated with golden parachutes). 
 110. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 82, at 80–81. 
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returns when golden parachutes are adopted.111 Second, golden 
parachutes increase the likelihood that a firm will receive an acquisition 
offer and ultimately be acquired.112 If we limit (i.e. condition) our 
analysis to firms that are actually acquired, we find that target firms 
that provide golden parachutes to the CEO receive smaller premiums; 
however, this conditional effect is more than offset by the increased 
likelihood of an acquisition.113 Golden parachutes lead to higher 
unconditional expected acquisition premiums.114 
To be sure, scholars express some concerns about golden 
parachutes. Most notably, golden parachutes may undermine 
managerial incentives for effort post-adoption. Concerns regarding 
managerial incentives also apply to merger side payments, at least to 
the extent that a side payment is anticipated. For example, in 
anticipation of receiving a side payment an executive may not mind 
having her firm acquired. The incentive problem, however, may be 
worse in the context of a golden parachute since the payment is 
contractually guaranteed. By contrast, a side payment is contingent 
and thus may be viewed as a reward for effort prior to the sale. Along 
these lines, Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang find that firms “that adopt 
GPs experience negative abnormal stock returns both during and 
subsequent to the period surrounding their adoptions.”115 This 
suggests that golden parachutes may increase managerial slack.116 They 
admit, however, that golden parachutes may be driven in part by 
selection bias, as firms adopting a golden parachute tend to be worse 
performing prior to the golden parachute.117 
 
 111. See, e.g., Richard A. Lambert & David F. Larcker, Golden Parachutes, Executive 
Decision-Making and Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 179, 183–89 (1985). 
 112. Bebchuk, Cohen & Wang, supra note 109, at 142–45, 153 (includes data on golden 
parachutes for all firms in the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) database from 
1990 to 2006. This database includes corporate governance “provisions for 1,400 to 2,000 
firms, including all the firms belonging to the S&P500 and other firms considered important by 
the IRRC,” with longitudinal variation for each firm across IRRC volumes.). 
 113. See id. at 140–47. 
 114. See id. at 140–41, 147–48; see also Robert Comment & G. William Schwert, Poison 
or Placebo? Evidence on the Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures, J. 
FIN. ECON., June 1995, at 3, 10–18 (explaining how to measure unconditional 
acquisition premiums). 
 115. Bebchuk, Cohen & Wang, supra note 109, at 140. 
 116. See id. at 153. 
 117. See id. at 151. 
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In addition to selection concerns, the study by Bebchuk, Cohen, 
and Wang also appears to suffer from omitted variable bias, as it fails 
to control for straight severance protection. Straight severance 
protection is a term in an executive’s employment contract that 
entitles her to severance payments if she is terminated. It does not 
require a change-in-control event to trigger the payment. Firms that 
offer their CEO a golden parachute are more likely to also offer 
straight severance protection.118 In a new article, Andrew Lund and 
Robert Schonlau re-estimate the regression models from Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Wang, but add a control variable for severance.119 Lund 
and Schonlau find that the negative effect on shareholder welfare (at 
least after 2006) is not driven by golden parachutes, but rather by the 
adoption of severance protection.120 The fact that golden parachutes 
have no effect on a firm’s performance once severance provisions are 
accounted for suggests that golden parachutes may have little impact 
on managerial slack. Overall, there appears to be more evidence that 
shareholders benefit from golden parachutes than from side payments.  
Though golden parachutes may lower the threshold level at which 
a CEO is willing to support a sale of her firm, it does not create a 
conflict with respect to the CEO’s negotiation of a merger premium. 
As long as the golden parachute is fixed in advance, the CEO still has 
every incentive to bargain for a high shareholder premium. By 
contrast, side payments create an incentive for the CEO to trade away 
shareholder premium in exchange for increased side payment.121 
Further empirical work is necessary to better assess the tradeoff 
between a golden parachute and a merger side payment. My analysis 
predicts a greater risk of rent extraction via merger side payments as 
compared to golden parachutes, and I hope that future empirical 
research tests this hypothesis. 
 
 118. See Andrew C.W. Lund & Robert Schonlau, Golden Parachutes, Severance and Firm 
Value, 16–20 (Oct. 28, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2682456 
(noting a positive correlation between GPs and severance). 
 119. See id. at 28–29. 
 120. Id. at 4, 10–11. 
 121. The presence of a golden parachute does not appear to divert merger surplus away 
from target shareholders to the benefit of acquirers. See Eliezer M. Fich et al., On the Importance 
of Golden Parachutes, 48 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1717 (2013). Large golden 
parachutes are associated with higher acquirer returns, suggesting that excessive golden 
parachute contracts can undermine the CEO’s bargaining power such that acquirers can get a 
lower price. See id. at 1746–47. But the general result is that target shareholders benefit from 
golden parachutes due to the increased likelihood of sale. See id. at 1748–51. 
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V. EXISTING LEGAL AND MARKET CONSTRAINTS 
Given the above, it is, perhaps, surprising that public commentary 
has focused more on policing golden parachutes than on merger side 
payments. Nonetheless, several laws that regulate golden parachutes 
also apply to the use of merger side payments. In 1984, Congress 
attempted to discourage excessive parachutes and side payments by 
imposing tax penalties—sections 280G and 4999 of the Internal 
Revenue Code—on executive payouts above a threshold level.122 More 
recently, the Dodd-Frank Act, which passed in 2010, requires 
publicly-held firms to allow advisory shareholder votes on change-of-
control benefits, defined to include both golden parachutes and 
merger side payments.123 These requirements are in addition to 
corporate law, securities regulation, and market forces which all work 
to constrain merger side payments in various ways. The remainder of 
this Part briefly describes existing legal and extra-legal protections for 
shareholders against merger side payments. 
A. Multiple Bidders for Target 
Probably the biggest constraint on opportunistic side payments 
comes from the prospect of a second bidder.124 If side payments lead 
to a lower merger premium,125 as predicted by rent extraction,126 this 
creates an opportunity for a second bidder to enter the fray. In fact, 
the presence of side payments from the first bidder may give the 
second bidder an advantage in any resulting auction. The second 
bidder can devote its funds solely to shareholders and does not need 
to pay extra amounts to target executives. The second bidder can thus 
outbid the first bidder by up to the amount of excess side payments 
and still pay no more on a total basis. 
 
 122. See I.R.C. § 280G (2012); I.R.C. § 4999 (2012). For a discussion of these code 
provisions, see Joy Sabino Mullane, The Unlearning Curve: Tax-Based Congressional Regulation 
of Executive Compensation, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 1045, 1050–56 (2011). 
 123. See Bebchuk, Cohen & Wang, supra note 109, at 140; see also Dodd–Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–1900 
(2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §78n–1 (2012)). 
 124. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 62. 
 125. This can arise because target managers are more willing to accept a lower share price 
when they receive side payments and because side payments eat up a portion of the total price 
that an acquirer is willing or able to pay. 
 126. See supra Section III.B. 
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The target CEO, the beneficiary of such side payments, may be 
reluctant to engage a competing bidder. The second bidder, however, 
can make its intentions known either by contacting the board with its 
offer or by making a tender offer directly to the firm’s shareholders. 
Ultimately, such tactics place a great deal of pressure on the target 
CEO and the target board to remove excessive side payments and 
focus on shareholder interests. For one thing, this setting may trigger 
Revlon duties, placing additional legal obligations on the board to 
focus exclusively on shareholder interests.127 Also, target shareholders 
will only accept a bundled transaction to the extent that it beats the 
deal offered by the next highest bidder. In essence, the arrival of a 
second bidder, or beliefs about latent bidders, transforms the status 
quo—or, more technically, the shareholders’ threat position—from no 
deal at all to whatever the competing bidder is offering. In anticipation 
of such concerns the initial bidder may be reluctant to agree to large 
side payments; it does not want to make a low-ball offer that attracts 
competing bids. 
If the market for corporate acquisitions were perfect (i.e. lots of 
bidders) and if all acquirers brought identical synergies to the table, 
the competition could eliminate rent extraction from merger side 
payments. Competition would force bidders to give the entire merger 
surplus to target shareholders. If a bidder tried to make a lower offer, 
an alternative acquirer would outbid it. With perfect competition, the 
acquirer would simply receive the market rate of return (i.e. no 
surplus) and the target CEO would receive the minimum side 
payment necessary for incentive alignment purposes.128 Target 
shareholders would receive the entire merger surplus—an 
optimal result.  
In reality, competition in the market for corporate acquisitions is 
imperfect at best. Most completed mergers involve a single bidder 
with some studies finding that over 90% of acquisitions involve only 
 
 127. When the sale or breakup of a firm is imminent, the firm’s directors have fiduciary 
obligations—so-called Revlon duties—to get the best price possible for shareholders.  See Revlon, 
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986); see also Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon-Land, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3277 (2013). 
 128. The target CEO may also receive a retention contract or other benefits that increase 
the value of the target firm to the acquirer. The key point, however, is that with perfect 
competition, we would not need to worry about merger side payments as the market would 
force these to the level that maximizes the price the acquirer would pay to target shareholders. 
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one bidder.129 Still, even if there is only one bidder, the target board 
must still take some steps to insure it is getting the best price for 
shareholders, as required by Revlon.130 In practice, this means having 
an investment bank prepare a valuation analysis suggesting a fair price 
for the target and soliciting other bidders or running an auction to 
provide an off-market check of the acquisition price. With a well-
designed sale process and no second bidder, it would be very difficult 
for an objecting shareholder to prevail on a Revlon claim.131 In the 
absence of a second bidder, the target’s board has considerable 
discretion to recommend a sale that includes a large side payment to 
the CEO and other senior executives. 
Furthermore, in a strategic acquisition context, merger synergies 
likely depend on the identity of the buyer. Simply put, one buyer may 
be able to pay more than any other, not because of financing 
constraints but due to acquirer-specific synergies.132 Such disparities 
suggest that more bidders may not be sufficient to remove rent 
extraction. If a less synergistic bidder were to emerge it would be 
unable to drive the price sufficiently high to squeeze out excessive side 
payments. Some degree of rent extraction remains. The result is a 
semi-competitive market for corporate control, one that limits but 
does not remove rent extraction. 
B. Tax Incentives 
The tax code—sections 280G and 4999—seeks to discourage 
excessive change-of-control payments to senior executives of target 
 
 129. See Sandra Betton, B. Espen Eckbo & Karin S. Thorburn, Merger Negotiations and 
the Toehold Puzzle, 91 J. FIN. ECON. 158, 164 tbl.1 (2009) (finding based on more than 10,000 
acquisitions from 1973 to 2002 that the target firm received bids from multiple parties in only 
approximately 8% of the sample observations). Other studies find a higher degree of multi-bidder 
contests. See, e.g., Nihat Aktas, Eric de Bodt & Richard Roll, Negotiations Under the Threat of 
an Auction, 98 J. FIN. ECON. 241, 243 (2010). Further, the lack of a second bidder does not 
rule out latent competition. 
 130. Revlon, Inc., 506 A.2d at 182. 
   131. Id. at 182–84. 
 132. To illustrate, assume there are unique synergies between acquirer A and a hypothetical 
target firm. Acquirer A is willing to pay up to $150 million to buy target while other acquirers 
are only willing to pay up to $100 million for the target firm.  Acquirer A could offer excessive 
side payments to the CEO of the target firm and still afford to pay $101 million for the target 
firm.  Market pressure from other bidders, unfortunately, cannot drive down such side payments 
because the maximum amount that the other bidders are willing to pay for target is only 
$100 million. 
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firms.133 A qualifying change-of-control payment is defined to include 
both merger side payments and golden parachutes.134 These code 
provisions apply to both publicly-held and privately-held targets; 
however, privately-held targets can waive the requirement with a 
supermajority shareholder vote.135 Provided that the aggregate 
amount of such payments (side payments plus golden parachute 
payments) is below a threshold level equal to three times the 
executive’s average annual compensation over the past five years, these 
code provisions have no effect.136 On the other hand, if a senior 
executive of the target firm receives side payments that exceed this 
threshold level, then she faces a 20% excise tax on all excess payments, 
in addition to the ordinary income taxes on such payments.137 Also, 
the corporation may not take a tax deduction for the 
excess payments.138 
These sections of the tax code suggest an alternative explanation 
for why empirical studies find a significant negative correlation 
between merger side payments and golden parachute entitlements.139 
The finance literature generally attributes this finding to incentive 
alignment, arguing that CEOs with inadequate severance protection 
(i.e. below average golden parachutes) require a larger side payment 
to align their incentives with those of shareholders.140 An alternative 
view is that executives with low golden parachute entitlements have 
more cap-space under threshold payment level set by IRC section 
280G, and thus can receive larger side payments without triggering a 
 
 133. I.R.C. §§ 280G(a), 4999 (2012). 
 134. The definition of a parachute payment in § 280G(b)(2)(A) is so sufficiently broad 
that it includes both golden parachutes and what I refer to as merger side payments. 
 135. The requirements of sections 280G and 4999 are waived for privately-held firms if (i) 
the firm has fewer than 100 shareholders and only one class of stock or (ii) a separate shareholder 
vote supported by at least 75% of the firm’s shareholders is taken to authorize the side payment. 
See Susan Dixon & Jose Singer-Freeman, Private Corporations and Section 280G of the Code, 
PRACTICAL LAW CO. (2012), http://www.fdh.com/bulletin/0002.pdf. 
 136. See definition of “excess parachute payment” in I.R.C. § 280G(b)(1) (2012) (“[A]n 
amount equal to the excess of any parachute payment over the portion of the base amount 
allocated to such payment.”) and “base amount” in I.R.C. § 280G(b)(3) (2012) (“[T]he 
individual’s annualized includible compensation for the base period.”). 
 137. See I.R.C. § 4999(a) (2012). 
 138. See I.R.C. § 280G(a) (2012). 
   139. See, e.g., Fich, Contractual Revisions, supra note 35; see also Hartzell, supra note 24. 
 140. See, e.g., Fich, Contractual Revisions, supra note 35; see also Hartzell, supra note 24. 
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tax penalty.141 Unfortunately, existing research has not clarified the 
impact that these tax provisions have on side payment levels. 
It should be noted that sections 280G and 4999 in no way 
prohibit large side payments. Indeed, this is precisely the point of 
using a tax; the law taxes —rather than prohibits—excessive payouts 
to target executives in connection with a merger. The CEO of a target 
firm can negotiate for a merger side payment that exceeds three times 
her average base pay. Furthermore, a CEO may negotiate for a gross-
up payment from the target corporation to cover any additional tax 
liability that he faces as a result of IRC section 4999. Indeed, having 
the corporation pay the CEO’s tax liability does not appear to be an 
unusual outcome,142 even though it leads to the incongruous result 
that shareholders ultimately pay the cost and are made worse off by a 
tax provision designed to protect shareholders from excessive change-
of-control payments.143  
C. Securities Regulation 
Securities regulation protects shareholders through two primary 
mechanisms: (i) disclosure and (ii) a prohibition against fraud or 
deception. Consequently, in its proxy statement a target firm is 
obligated to disclose side payments, or related benefits, received by its 
CEO in connection with the acquisition.144 Disclosure alerts 
shareholders to possible conflicts with the CEO, but disclosure does 
not give shareholders any meaningful ability to oppose an excessive 
side payment. In fact, even with full disclosure it may be perfectly 
rational for shareholders to vote in favor of a bundled merger 
transaction, regardless if it results in rent extraction. Jeff Gordon notes 
the inadequacy of disclosures as a remedy against bundling in the 
context of dual-class recapitalizations.145 Many of the dual-class 
 
 141. Because the definition of a parachute payment in I.R.C. § 280G(b)(2)(A) (2012) 
includes both golden parachutes and side payments, the use of golden parachutes creates a 
deterrent for also granting side payments. 
 142. See Mullane, supra note 122, at 1054. 
 143. See id. 
 144. In its DEF14A filing, a target firm is obligated to disclose any economic interests that 
its directors and executive officers have in the merger that is different from, or in addition to, 
their interests as stockholders. See Information Required in Proxy Statement, 17 C.F.R. § 
240.14a-101 (2016). 
 145. See Gordon, Ties that Bond, supra note 87, at 42–43. For a broader discussion of the 
limitations of disclosure, see Steven M. Davidoff & Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure (Pub. Law 
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recapitalizations studied by Gordon included an increase in annual 
dividend payments (desired by shareholders) in connection with the 
use of a dual-class structure that weakened shareholder-voting rights 
(opposed by shareholders).146  Disclosure of the loss of voting rights 
associated with the dual-class structure did not prevent shareholders 
from approving these recapitalizations.147 Full disclosure of side 
payments insulates the target firm against securities fraud, but 
disclosure by itself does not provide shareholders with any meaningful 
ability to voice their opposition to such arrangements, other than to 
vote against the entire merger.148 
In addition to disclosure, securities regulation also addresses side 
payments and golden parachutes through advisory shareholder voting 
requirements under the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act.149 The law gives 
shareholders an annual advisory (i.e., non-binding) vote on executive 
compensation generally (say-on-pay), and a separate advisory vote on 
golden parachutes (say-on-parachutes).150 The say-on-parachute 
provision gives shareholders an opportunity to cast an advisory vote 
on some forms of merger side payments such as merger bonuses, 
unscheduled option grants, and augmented parachutes.151 However, it 
does not cover retention agreements or board seats offered by the 
acquiring firm. 
I am unaware of empirical studies examining the effectiveness of 
the SEC’s new voting requirements as related to side payments. There 
has, however, been empirical work examining say-on-pay in Britain. 
Even though such vote is purely advisory, the British experience with 
say-on-pay suggests that it may limit excessive side payments, 
particularly if the payment could be characterized as a “reward for 
 
& Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 205, 2012), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2168427. 
 146. See Gordon, Ties that Bond, supra note 87, at 42–43. 
 147. See id. 
 148. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2016). 
 149. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1375, 1899 (2010) (adding new section 14A to the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934). 
 150. See id. 
 151. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291 § 14A(b)(2), 48 Stat. 881, 
895–96 (codified at Shareholder Approval Of Executive Compensation, 15 U.S.C. § 78n-
1 (2012)). 
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failure.”152 Furthermore, an advisory vote on merger side payments 
may have desirable ancillary effects on other areas of corporate law and 
securities regulation, most importantly by forcing the target board of 
directors to make an explicit voting recommendation regarding the 
CEO’s side payment. 
In order to recommend that shareholders vote for a particular side 
payment, a voting item on the proxy statement, the board may need 
to state its reasons for such advice.153 Such disclosure is not costly in 
itself, but it would force a board to come up with reasons justifying 
the side payment. Furthermore, the board would need to believe that 
such reasons are in fact true. If a board does not believe its own advice, 
it may be open to liability under SEC Rule 14a-9 for a deceptive 
opinion.154 In the context of side payments, this means that a target’s 
board would need to convince itself that the requested side payments 
were in fact necessary for incentive alignment purposes. To support its 
voting advice on the say-on-side payment issue, the board is likely to 
monitor side payments more closely, possibly even seeking a fairness 
opinion related to certain side payments. Thus, while it is too early to 
tell if the say-on-side payment votes, which have only been in effect 
for the past couple of years, will constrain rent extraction, there is at 
least some reason for optimism. 
On the other hand, the analogy to say-on-pay may break down if 
an acquisition is an end-of-life event for the target firm, reducing the 
shame of receiving a negative shareholder vote. A target CEO, who 
does not have to return to work the next day, may be less susceptible 
to shaming and other informal sanctions, at least compared to a typical 
say-on-pay vote. While disclosure and advisory voting may limit rent 
extraction, this does not solve the inherent problem presented 
by bundling.  
D. Corporate Law 
Under corporate law, shareholders may seek an injunction or 
damages if a merger side payment were to create sufficient conflicts to 
 
 152. See Fabrizio Ferri & David A. Maber, Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: 
Evidence from the UK, 17 REV. FIN. 527, 528 (2013). 
 153. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2016). 
 154. See Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1091–96 (1991). In 
addition to showing that the directors did not believe their own opinions, a plaintiff would also 
need to show that such opinions were in fact wrong. Id. 
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contaminate a board’s merger recommendation. As a practical matter, 
however, such conflicts will generally be cleansed through the merger 
approval process, meaning the entire transaction—including the 
side payment—would typically be protected by the business 
judgment rule.155 
It is hard to imagine a realistic fact pattern where side payments 
would be a sufficient problem for a judge to award an injunction. Even 
if a conflict were truly extreme, such that it could not be adequately 
cleansed or merger negotiations were conducted in bad faith, a judge 
may be reluctant to issue an injunction. The judge would be presented 
with the same bundled offer that shareholders and directors have an 
incentive to support because it is better than the status quo. 
Shareholder litigation related to the 2012 acquisition of El Paso 
Corporation by Kinder Morgan illustrates the limitation of the 
injunctive remedy. This deal included substantial side benefits to El 
Paso’s CEO, Douglas Foshee.156 Based on this and other conflicts, a 
group of El Paso shareholders sued for an injunction.157 The Delaware 
Chancery Court judge hearing the case, Leo Strine, admitted that 
conflicts of interest impacted the negotiation of the El Paso buyout.158 
“[W]hen El Paso’s CEO was supposed to be getting the maximum 
price from Kinder Morgan, he actually had an interest in not doing 
that.”159 Despite these facts, Chancellor Strine “reluctantly” denied 
the shareholders’ motion because of the high-proposed 
buyout premium.160  
The record thus persuades me that the plaintiffs have a reasonable 
likelihood of success in proving that the Merger was tainted by 
disloyalty. Because, however, there is no other bid on the table and 
the stockholders of El Paso, as the seller, have a choice whether to 
turn down the Merger themselves, the balance of harms counsels 
 
 155. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 56–62 (discussing the legal treatment of 
side payments). 
 156. Scott Thurm, El Paso CEO Is Set for $91 Million in Exit Pay After Kinder Morgan 
Deal, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970
204346104576637433532101762. 
 157. In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 432 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
 158. See id. at 434. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 452; see also Michael J. de la Merced & Clifford Krauss, Kinder Morgan to Buy 
El Paso for $21.1 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2011, 9:53 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/kinder-morgan-to-buy-el-paso/?_r=0 (noting 
that the deal included a 37% acquisition premium). 
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against a preliminary injunction. Although the pursuit of a monetary 
damages award may not be likely to promise full relief, the record 
does not instill in me the confidence to deny, by grant of an 
injunction, El Paso’s stockholders from accepting a transaction that 
they may find desirable in current market conditions, despite the 
disturbing behavior that led to the final terms.161 
Judges do not have a line-item veto, and are therefore reluctant to 
strike down a multi-billion-dollar transaction because of side 
payments. Judges are reluctant to use their injunctive power for the 
same reason that shareholders and directors have trouble blocking 
such deals—a deal with an unsavory side payment is better than no 
deal at all. 
A fiduciary suit for monetary damages offers more promise. In a 
fiduciary suit, a judge would not have to block the entire transaction. 
In theory, with full information a judge could separate the rent 
extraction component from the incentive alignment component, and 
appropriately set damages so as to not discourage mergers which may 
require a side payment, but to set damages that penalize 
rent extraction. 
This view of monetary damages is problematic for several reasons. 
First, it may be unrealistic to assume that a court can accurately 
separate rent assignment from incentive alignment in setting damages. 
If courts frequently make errors and overstate damages, this could 
inadvertently discourage valuable deals from going forward. Target’s 
CEO may be concerned that an incentive alignment side payment will 
nonetheless be challenged in court and, fearing a non-trivial chance of 
judicial error, the CEO may decide instead to block the sale altogether. 
Even if we assume that courts can accurately set damages to 
encourage incentive alignment and discourage rent extraction, there 
is still the problem that under current law most fiduciary suits based 
on a merger side payment will never even get to the damages stage of 
the litigation. First, plaintiff has to successfully argue that the case is 
direct rather than derivative, as target shareholders have no standing 
to bring a derivate suit after a deal has been completed.162  
 
 161. In re El Paso Corp., 41 A.3d at 434–35. 
 162. After a merger is completed, the derivative standing of former shareholders of the 
target firm is generally extinguished. See generally Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040 
(Del. 1984). 
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Second, the plaintiff must successfully characterize the side 
payments and other benefits received by target executives as a conflict 
of interest for fiduciary purposes. After the foregoing discussion this 
may seem obvious, but it is not. Indeed, courts do not generally treat 
an executive’s retention agreement or acceptance of a board seat with 
the acquiring firm as a conflict of interest.163 Consequently, a board’s 
recommendation of a sale involving such benefits will not receive 
judicial scrutiny absent other facts. 
Finally, supposing a plaintiff is able to show a conflict of interest, 
that conflict will generally be cleansed through the merger approval 
process. Under Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) section 
144, a conflict of interest can be procedurally cleansed if all material 
facts related to the conflict of interest are disclosed, or known, and the 
transaction is then authorized by either (i) the affirmative votes of a 
majority of the disinterested directors acting in good faith,164 or (ii) a 
majority of shareholder voting in good faith.165 The result of such 
cleansing is that the transaction will generally be given protection 
under the business judgment rule, effectively shielding the action from 
judicial review and leading to dismissal.  
When DGCL 144 is applied to a conflict created by a merger side 
payment, this means that the entire transaction—including the side 
payment—is cleansed by an informed vote supported by a majority of 
the firm’s independent directors or by an informed shareholder vote. 
In the context of a merger, a vote will necessarily occur at both the 
board level and at the shareholder level, meaning the conflict 
associated with the side payment is effectively cleansed through 
disclosure and support for the merger.166 
To be sure, the Delaware Supreme Court in a recent decision, 
Gantler v. Stephens, suggests a narrower interpretation of stockholder 
 
 163. See, e.g., In re W. Nat’l Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 15927, 2000 WL 710192 (Del. 
Ch. May 22, 2000) (holding that cash payments to target executives neither create a conflict of 
interest nor breach of duty of loyalty); In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 
6164-VCP, 2011 WL 2028076 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2011) (expectation of employment with the 
new company is not, in itself, sufficient to establish a conflict of interest on the part of 
the directors). 
 164. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (2016). 
 165. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(2) (2016). Alternatively, a self-dealing transaction 
can be cleansed by showing that the transaction is entirely fair to shareholders. See DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(3) (2016). 
 166. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 50. 
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ratification.167 Specifically, “the only director action or conduct that 
can be ratified is that which the shareholders are specifically asked to 
approve.”168 Applied to the context of merger side payments, this 
suggests that a bundled shareholder vote approving a merger 
transaction would not be sufficient to cleanse side payments to the 
firm’s CEO.  
Nonetheless, practitioners have found a work-around to this 
problem by providing a separate shareholder vote for the issue to be 
cleansed, and making the broader deal contingent on an affirmative 
shareholder vote on the cleansing issue.169 In the context of merger 
side payments, this workaround effectively re-bundles the side 
payment into the broader merger vote. A shareholder who wishes to 
vote in favor of the merger must also vote for the issue to be cleansed. 
Nonetheless, even if the target firm does not provide a separate 
shareholder voting item for merger side payments as suggested by 
Gantler, the side payment would be entitled to business judgment 
protection by the vote of a majority of disinterested directors.170 Under 
current law, absent bad-faith negotiation tactics,171 a merger side 
payment is likely to be shielded from judicial review and such a case is 
likely to be quickly dismissed.172  
VI. ANALYSIS AND LAW REFORM 
In this Part, I first consider the desirability of existing laws 
regulating merger side payments. I then propose two legal reforms 
that may reduce the risk of rent extraction through side payments 
without blocking them altogether.  In particular, I consider (i) upfront 
contractual restrictions limiting side payments, and (ii) an amendment 
to corporate law. 
 
 167. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). 
 168. Id. at 713. 
 169. See Mark J. Gentile, John Mark Zeberkiewicz & Megan R. Wischmeier, Stockholder 
Ratification: A Review of the Benefits and Burdens, BLOOMBERG L. REP., Feb. 2009, at 2. 
 170. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (2016). 
 171. See Parnes v. Bally Entm’t Corp., 722 A.2d 1243 (Del. 1999) (showing that bad-faith 
negotiation by the CEO regarding side payments removes business judgment rule protection). 
 172. This assumes that the case will even be classified as a direct suit that does not need to 
plead demand futility. In a post-merger fiduciary challenge, a former shareholder generally lacks 
standing to bring a derivative suit. 
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A. Current Law as Second Best 
Even acknowledging that the law fails to prevent rent extraction, 
one may still view the current set of legal protections as the best 
available for an imperfect world. This view is especially attractive in 
light of longstanding legal acceptance of takeover defenses such as the 
poison pill.173 Hostile takeovers have largely disappeared since the end 
of the 1980s.174 In this environment, merger side payments are one of 
the few tools that can be used to overcome managerial entrenchment. 
The law responds by allowing side payments, but adding disclosure 
and a tax penalty for especially large side payments. This has the 
benefit of facilitating a sale of the firm, while putting soft protections 
in place that prevent extreme forms of rent extraction. 
In further support of the current legal regime, rent extraction is 
only a distributional problem. Rent extraction does not prevent the ex 
post efficient outcome (sale of the firm) and it does not diminish the 
size of the merger surplus. It merely redistributes benefits from 
shareholders to the CEO, but the total size of the gains remains the 
same. This point is easily seen in Table 2 by comparing the $3 million 
side payment to the $13 million side payment.175 In both cases, the 
same merger surplus ($97 million) is created.176 From an ex post 
efficiency perspective, it does not matter whether these gains go to 
shareholders or to the CEO. 
Focusing exclusively on the sale, however, hides various ex ante 
distortions that may arise in expectation of rent extraction. First, 
expectation of a large side payment may undermine a manager’s 
incentive to put forth effort throughout her employment period. 
More generally, side payments undermine the disciplinary effect of the 
market for corporate control. In the corporate governance literature, 
the threat of losing one’s job through a takeover serves as an 
important disciplining device for top executives.177 Under the standard 
 
 173. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (validating the 
use of a poison pill defensive measure). 
 174. See Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford, supra note 18, at 106 (finding that only 4% of 
acquisitions between 1990 and 1998 involved a hostile bid at any point in the deal process). 
   175. See supra Table 2. 
   176. See supra Table 2. 
 177. See generally Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. 
POL. ECON. 110 (1965) (introducing the concept of a market for corporate control and 
discussing the disciplinary impact of corporate managers); Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their 
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view, a manager realizes that if her firm underperforms it will become 
an attractive takeover target for an acquirer hoping to turn the 
business around, and in the process she will lose her job as 
“punishment” for poor performance.178 Yet, the punishment loses its 
bite if the CEO is able to extract a large side payment on the way out 
the door. Anticipating this, a CEO may be indifferent to the threat of 
takeover and invest less effort into her job ex ante. In this context, side 
payments create a reward for failure. 
Second, worse than merely being indifferent, a CEO may actually 
seek out a merger side payment. This may cause a manager to waste 
effort endogenously positioning her firm to be acquired. At the 
extreme, this may even cause the firm to inefficiently change its 
underlying projects to better situate itself for an acquisition. Even 
though shareholders receive a merger premium from any resulting 
sale, management may have caused the firm to forego some positive 
net present value (NPV) projects in the pursuit of being acquired. 
Third, expectation of rent extraction may raise the upfront cost of 
capital. Equity investors anticipate that managers may extract value 
through a side payment and they price the shares accordingly. With a 
higher cost of capital some desirable projects (positive NPV) may fail 
to attract financing and economic growth may be compromised. To 
be sure, for publicly-held targets, merger side payments are modest 
compared to the acquisition price, and target shareholders still capture 
most of the gains from sale.179 If this were the only problem, the effect 
on the cost of capital would be modest. However, if we also consider 
that equity investors may anticipate the distorting effect that large side 
payments may have on managerial effort during the course of 
employment and price this into their upfront investment, then the 
effect on cost of capital potentially becomes much worse. Namely, 
potential investors will demand higher upfront returns (i.e. more 
equity) to compensate for value they might lose to side payments ex 
 
Causes and Consequences, 2 J.  ECON. PERSP. 21 (1988) (noting that threat of takeover can help 
align executives’ incentives with shareholders). 
 178. Kenneth J. Martin & John J. McConnell, Corporate Performance, Corporate 
Takeovers, and Management Turnover, 46 J. FIN. 671, 671 (1991). 
 179. For an angel investor or other party financing a privately-held firm, the concern over 
rent extraction may be more severe, as side payments are much larger as a fraction of deal size. 
See Broughman & Fried, Carrots and Sticks, supra note 25, at 1351 (noting, that when offered, 
non-retention management bonuses to executives of VC-backed firms are on average 6.6% of 
the merger price). 
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post. Unfortunately, we cannot measure the magnitude of such ex 
ante distortions, but these concerns at least cast doubt on the 
optimality of current legal protections. 
B. Possible Reforms 
Merger side payments present a particularly difficult challenge for 
law reform. Usual corporate governance mechanisms such as 
disclosure and director independence are inadequate.180 The problem 
is further complicated by the fact that side payments are sometimes 
necessary to counter managerial entrenchment. Any reform that 
blocks side payments runs the risk that it may prevent transactions 
desired by shareholders. Managerial entrenchment is potentially a 
much worse problem than rent extraction.181 
In Section VI.B, I consider two possible reforms that may reduce 
the use of side payments as rent extraction without blocking them 
altogether. First, I evaluate contractual restrictions on side payments, 
noting two limitations of this approach: (i) waiver through bundled 
renegotiation and (ii) inability to specify the incentive alignment 
payment ex ante. Second, I propose a small amendment to corporate 
law. Firms should be given the choice to opt into a heightened 
fiduciary standard by placing language in their charters requiring that 
any side benefit received by the CEO can only be cleansed via a 
separate vote upon which the broader acquisition cannot 
be contingent. 
1. Contract 
The relationship between a firm and its CEO is part of the broader 
nexus of contractual relations that define an organization.182 
Consequently one might hope that a contractual provision could be 
designed to limit rent extraction through merger side payments. For 
example, when negotiating over a CEO’s employment contract the 
 
 180. See supra Sections V.C & V.D. 
 181. Furthermore, some side payments—such as retention agreements, non-competes, and 
post-merger consulting—may be desired by acquirers, and may increase the size of the merger 
surplus. An acquirer may be willing to pay more for the target firm if it is able to retain key 
employees, and design appropriate contracts to incentivize such individuals going forward. 
Consequently, any reform proposal that interferes with an acquirer’s ability to offer a retention 
agreement to target executives would probably lead to worse problems than the risk of rent 
extraction under the current law. 
 182. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1416, 1426 (1989) (describing corporate entities as a nexus of contractual relations). 
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firm could ask for a provision limiting the dollar amount that the CEO 
can receive through any form of merger side payment to some capped 
amount. This can be thought of as an iron weight attached to the 
CEO’s golden parachute. 
To illustrate with a concrete example, the CEO may bargain for a 
golden parachute that entitles her to a payment equal to $1.5M if the 
firm is acquired, and the employer may ask for an iron weight that 
limits the total amount of “merger benefits”—including both golden 
parachutes and side payments—that the CEO can receive from any 
future acquisition to $2M. This would effectively give the CEO 
freedom to negotiate up to $0.5M in side payments in addition to her 
contractual entitlement to a $1.5M parachute. “Merger benefits” 
would need to be defined broadly in the merger agreement so that it 
includes all forms of side payments including excess compensation 
(above a defined amount) received through a retention contract or 
post-merger consulting from the acquirer, and a remedy would need 
to be specified (e.g. clawback) if the CEO were to receive 
excess payments. 
Putting aside definitional concerns and questions about the 
enforceability of a restriction on compensation from an acquiring firm 
as future employer,183 there is an appeal to the iron-weight contract 
clause. Whereas a golden parachute entitles the CEO to a defined 
payment upon a change-in-control, an iron weight would set a 
limitation on the amount that a CEO could extract through extra side 
payments. By setting the iron-weight cap at the right level this 
provision may limit rent extraction without blocking 
incentive alignment. 
There are, however, two serious limitations that apply to any 
contractual solution. The first concern is that, under existing law, 
contracting parties cannot prevent consensual renegotiation of their 
original contract.184 This is an oft-noted problem in the literature on 
 
 183. The acquirer is not a party to the contract provision and the iron weight restriction 
may be viewed as type of a non-compete that places unreasonable constraints on future 
employment.  See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration 
Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. 
REV. 379, 391–92 (2006) (discussing limited enforceability of non-compete agreement). 
 184. This is an oft-noted problem in the literature on contract theory. See, e.g., Christine 
Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modification, 26 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 203, 204 (1997) (suggesting potential benefits from a commitment to 
not renegotiate). 
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contract theory, and is especially problematic in the context of merger 
side payments.185 To illustrate, a CEO could negotiate a desirable 
M&A sale where waiver of the iron weight is a condition to closing 
the sale. The CEO could then negotiate for a large side payment (in 
excess of the iron-weight cap) and bundle all of this together into one 
deal. Technically, the board would need to consent separately to a 
waiver of the iron-weight provision. But the arrangement would be 
bundled such that the board cannot authorize the merger agreement 
without first waiving the iron weight.186 The CEO’s agenda-setting 
power is used here to remove an inconvenient (to her) 
contractual restriction. 
For the same reason that side payments can be bundled into a 
merger agreement, a waiver or amendment of any contract provision 
can be bundled into a merger. The CEO has agenda-setting power to 
construct a bundled deal, which the board and shareholders are forced 
to accept or reject through a take-it-or-leave-it vote. The parties may 
try to address this problem up front by requiring a supermajority vote 
for any amendment to the iron weight provision, but even this is 
inadequate because it is rational for all directors and all shareholders 
to waive the iron weight when it is bundled into a desirable sale of 
the firm.187 
A second concern with any contractual solution is that the parties 
may be unable to specify with any precision the incentive alignment 
payment ex ante. This amount may depend on non-verifiable future 
contingencies that cannot be contracted over ex ante. Given an 
incomplete contract setup the parties may be reluctant to specify an 
iron weight that could inadvertently block a desirable merger by 
setting the incentive alignment compensation too low. In this case it 
may be a good thing that the parties can renegotiate ex ante 
provisions. But it also suggests that an ex ante iron-weight contract 
may be a pointless exercise that at best merely increases transactions 
costs, and at worst may prevent a valuable sale from occurring. 
 
 185. See id. 
 186. See supra Part IV. 
 187. For example, the parties may consider trying to add this provision to the corporate 
charter, such that it requires shareholder consent—possibly at a supermajority level—to modify 
the iron-weight provision. 
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2. Corporate law reform 
Given the inability of a contract to prevent rent extraction, I 
propose a small amendment to corporate law. Firms should be given 
the choice to opt into a heightened fiduciary standard by placing 
language in their charter requiring that any side benefit received by 
the CEO—and possibly other members of senior management—can 
only be cleansed via a separate vote, upon which the broader 
acquisition cannot be contingent. 
The problem with the existing law is it treats authorization of a 
merger as authorization of each component of the deal (merger and 
side payment).188 Yet, shareholders and directors only vote on the 
combined bundle rather than on each part separately. Shareholder 
approval of a bundled vote does not mean that each element of the 
deal is good for shareholders. It merely means that the entire 
transaction is better than no deal at all. The shareholders may still 
disfavor the side payment component. 
One way to implement an opt-in reform would be to limit DGCL 
sections 144(a)(1) and (a)(2)—provisions describing the cleansing of 
conflict-of-interest transactions—to director or shareholder votes that 
were in some meaningful sense unbundled from the broader merger 
authorization. At a minimum, this would require a separate board or 
shareholder vote authorizing the side payment. Such vote must not be 
tied to the passage of a specific merger transaction. For example, if the 
merger agreement made acceptance of the side payment a condition 
to closing, the side payment obviously would not be unbundled, even 
if shareholders were given a chance to vote on the side payment 
separate from the broader merger vote. Informed shareholders would 
understand that they need to vote yes on the side payment if they want 
the merger to go forward; the mere presence of a separate voting item 
would be irrelevant. 
Board or shareholder authorization of a side payment could either 
occur: (i) prior to the vote on a specific M&A transaction (pre-deal 
vote); or (ii) at the same time as the M&A vote (concurrent vote). A 
side payment authorized by a pre-deal vote is functionally a golden 
parachute, since the payout would be set prior to the terms of a merger 
agreement. If a pre-deal vote occurs in close proximity to a specific 
merger transaction, one may worry that this arrangement reflects an 
informal or implicit form of bundling. Shareholders may correctly 
 
 188. See supra notes 163–69 and accompanying text. 
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understand that if they vote against a pre-deal side payment they are 
effectively rejecting a potential merger proposal. 
As long as the acquisition terms have not yet been set, however, 
this is not actually bundling, but rather reflects the reality that 
management has a credible threat to block a sale of the firm. To see 
the distinction, note that if the shareholders vote in favor of a pre-deal 
side payment, the amount of side payment is now fixed. Management 
can subsequently bargain with an acquirer over the sale of the firm, 
but management cannot trade off merger premium for a larger side 
payment, since the side payment is fixed in advance. Put another way, 
authorization by a pre-deal vote may be necessary to get management 
to the negotiation table, but once they are at the table their bargaining 
incentives are aligned with shareholder welfare. 
By contrast, a side payment authorized by a concurrent vote may 
be problematic for the opposite reason. Here the merger and the side 
payment are separate voting items on the same proxy card (i.e. 
corporate ballot).189 Management puts the merger up for vote without 
knowing if they will receive the side payment, and for cleansing 
purposes, the merger itself cannot be made contingent on whether the 
side payment received shareholder support.190  If the side payment is 
necessary for incentive alignment purposes the CEO may be very 
reluctant to go this route. To avoid the possibility that shareholders 
may decline to approve an ex post side payment, firms would be 
encouraged to address the problem ex ante by adopting a golden 
parachute (i.e. a pre-deal side payment). 
My proposal does not attempt to block side payments; rather, it 
switches the level of judicial scrutiny based on how the side payment 
is authorized. If a side payment is authorized by an informed 
shareholder vote or by a vote of the independent directors, and such 
vote is decoupled from the merger itself, then (absent other problems) 
the transaction should be entitled to protection under the business 
judgment rule. By contrast, if a side payment is important for incentive 
alignment purposes and the deal planners do not want to expose it to 
shareholder or independent director vote, then they can still go 
forward with the sale and include the side payment, but the 
 
 189. The vote here would be concurrent, since the two items would be voted on at the 
same time. 
 190. After numerous shareholder complaints, this form of voting appears to have been the 
outcome in the XTRATA acquisition. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Gamesmanship in Xstrata-
Glencore Merger Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2012, 3:54 PM), http://dealbook. 
nytimes.com/2012/10/25/gamesmanship-in-xstrata-glencore-merger-vote/?_r=0. 
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transaction is no longer entitled to business judgment rule protection. 
Rather, the transaction would be scrutinized under the entire fairness 
standard, meaning that courts would inquire into whether the side 
payment was desirable for shareholders of the target firm. This 
approach is only a small departure from the existing law. 
Indeed, I have intentionally made this a fairly modest proposal out 
of concern that any more aggressive constraints on side payments may 
inadvertently increase managerial entrenchment. For this reason, I 
also suggest that this reform should be one that firms choose whether 
to opt-into or not. There is no reason that this needs to be a 
mandatory requirement. Instead, shareholders can decide whether 
they value extra protection against side payments, or whether they 
prefer the status quo. I believe my proposal could reduce the CEO’s 
agenda-setting power with respect to side payments, while still giving 
firms flexibility to compensate the CEO for negotiating a sale of 
the business. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I propose a new theory for merger side payments 
that helps explain evidence of rent extraction through side payments. 
While a typical agency conflict is driven by shareholders’ inability to 
observe bad behavior and lack of incentive to invest effort-monitoring 
management, merger side payments present a different problem. 
Similar to a legislative rider attached to a popular bill, target CEOs can 
use control over the corporate agenda to bundle an opportunistic side 
payment into a desired merger transaction, thereby making it 
impossible for target shareholders to oppose the side payment without 
also voting against the merger. Because side payments are bundled 
into a merger transaction, disclosure and voting rights cannot 
adequately protect shareholders against rent extraction. Instead, I 
propose a small reform to corporate law to help unbundle side 
payments from the broader merger vote, forcing the CEO to give up 
some of her agenda-setting power with respect to the design of 
side payments. 
This project contributes to literature on bundling in corporate law. 
My theory suggests testable predictions for comparing rent extraction 
through golden parachutes and merger side payments. I hope that 
future researchers will test these predictions, and that my analysis will 
be useful to judges and other policy makers addressing merger 
side payments. 
 
